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Abstract
In the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, when every player has a dif-
ferent discount factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if
and only if the discount factor of each player is higher than some
threshold. What happens if the players have incomplete information
regarding the discount factors? In this work we look at repeated games
in which each player has incomplete information regarding the other
player’s discount factor, and ask when a pair of grim-trigger strategies
is an equilibrium. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
such strategies to be an equilibrium. We characterize the states of
the world in which the strategies are not triggered, i.e., the players
cooperate, in such equilibria (or ǫ-equilibria), and ask whether these
“cooperation events” are close to those in the complete information
case, when the information is “almost” complete, in several senses.
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1 Introduction
In the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, when every player has a different dis-
count factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if and only if the
discount factor of each player is sufficiently close to 1. A similar situation
holds for other repeated two-player games in which there is a pair of pure ac-
tions τ = (τ1, τ2) such that under τ the payoff for each player is strictly higher
than some equilibrium payoff: there are two thresholds λ01, λ
0
2 such that the
grim-trigger course of action τ ∗ = (τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ), under which the players follows τ
until a deviation occur, and then they switch to the equilibrium action that
punishes the other player, is an equilibrium if and only if λi ≥ λ
0
i for i = 1, 2.
In a symmetric game, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, these thresholds are the
same for both players.1
In this work we look at repeated games in which each player has in-
complete information regarding the other player’s discount factor, and ask
when a pair of grim-trigger strategies is an equilibrium. A strategy in the
incomplete information game is information-dependent: a strategy assigns a
“course of action”, which is a strategy in the repeated game (with complete
information), to each state of the world. A pair of strategies will be called
“conditional-grim-trigger” if it is composed of two action pairs σ = (σ1, σ2)
and τ = (τ1, τ2), where (a) σ is an equilibrium of the one-shot game, (b) the
payoff under τ is higher than the payoff under σ for both players, and (c) in
any state of the world ω, player i either plays repeatedly σi, or plays τi until
a deviation from τ is detected, and then he switches to playing σi forever,
1Note that when the players have different discount factors, there may exist equilibria
which yield payoffs that are higher than the payoffs under any such τ∗. Such cooperative
equilibria are not in the scope of this work. See Lehrer and Pauzner (1999).
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for i = 1, 2. 2
In order for a player to cooperate (assuming his own discount factor is
sufficiently high), he needs to ascribe high enough probability that the other
player’s discount factor is higher than his threshold. But he also needs to
ascribe high enough probability that the other player ascribes high enough
probability that his own discount factor is higher than his own threshold,
and so on. We thus get that infinitely many conditions need to hold in order
for the conditional-grim-trigger strategy pair to be an equilibrium, one for
each level of belief for each player. Note that the “high enough” probability
in each level depends on the player’s own discount factor, since the higher his
discount factor is, the player will lose more if the grim-trigger course of action
is triggered. Therefore, a player with high discount factor will cooperate in
situations where he wouldn’t have cooperated if his discount factor was lower.
We show that this is not the case, and only two conditions for each player
are necessary and sufficient to characterize when the conditional-grim-trigger
strategy is a Bayesian equilibrium. In this strategy, each player plays the
grim-trigger course of action in some states of the world, which is called his
“cooperation event”, and the punishing strategy in the others. We show that
this strategy is a Bayesian equilibrium if and only if (a) each player plays
the grim-trigger course of action only when his discount factor is above his
threshold; and (b) each player ascribes sufficiently high probability to the
other player’s cooperation event whenever he plays the grim-trigger course
of action, and a sufficiently low probability to the other player’s cooperation
2This is a narrower sense of the concept of grim-trigger strategy, since we demand that
the pair of punishing strategies will define an equilibrium, instead of any pair σ = (σ1, σ2)
under which maxσ′
i
ui(σ
′
i, σj) < ui(τ) (Here and below, i is an arbitrary player and j is
the player which is not i). Because of this assumption, a conditional-grim-trigger strategy
pair Bayesian equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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event whenever he does not play this course of action. This result holds for
all belief structures, whether they are derived from a common prior or not.
We describe the sets of states of the world that satisfy these conditions,
and relate them to the concept of f -belief and common-f -belief. These two
concepts generalize the concepts of p-belief and common-p-belief defined by
Samet and Mondrer (1989). In particular, we show that for the repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, the strategy profile above is an equilibrium whenever each
player plays the cooperation strategy if he f -believes that it is a common-
f -belief that both players’ discount factors are above a given threshold. For
games with more then two actions for each player, an additional condition is
needed.
We also show that these conditions are sufficient, though not necessary, for
this kind of strategy to be a Bayesian equilibrium even if each player does not
know his own discount factor, and also in a larger class of two-player games
with incomplete information, in which there is an equilibrium which holds
in all states of the nature (equivalent to the “punishment” equilibrium) and
an equilibrium which holds only in some states of nature (equivalent to the
“cooperation” grim-trigger equilibrium, which holds only for high discount
factors). We also show that similar conditions are sufficient, though not
necessary, in repeated games with incomplete information with more than
two players.
Last, we look at belief spaces in which the information is “almost” com-
plete, in several senses, and see that in some senses, when the information is
almost complete, there is a conditional-grim-trigger ǫ-equilibrium in which
the players cooperate in all states of the world where they could have cooper-
ated under equilibrium in the complete information case, but for a set of small
probability, while in other senses, there may be no conditional-grim-trigger
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ǫ-equilibrium at all.
2 The Model
Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) be a two-player one-shot game: N = {1, 2} is
the set of players, and for every player i ∈ N , Ai is the set of pure actions
of player i, and ui is his utility function (extended multilinearly to mixed
strategies). Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies in Γ.
Assume that the payments in another non-equilibrium pure action profile τ =
(τ1, τ2), which we call a cooperation profile, are higher than the equilibrium
payments, that is ui(τ) > ui(σ) for i = 1, 2. Also, assume that for i = 1, 2,
τi is not a best response to σj , and, in particular, not in the support
3 of σi.
Let G = (N, (S,S),Π, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) be the repeated game based on Γ,
with incomplete information regarding the discount factors:
• N = {1, 2} is the set of players.
• (S,S) is a measurable space of the states of nature, that is, S ⊆ [0, 1)2
is the set of possible pairs of discount factors of the players. S is the
σ-algebra that is induced on S by the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1)2.
• Π = (Ω,Σ, λ, (Pi)i∈N) is the players’ belief space:
– (Ω,Σ) is a measurable space of states of the world.
– λ : Ω → S is a measurable function between the states of the
world and the states of nature, i.e., the players’ discount factors
are λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω)), where λi(ω) is player i’s discount factor
3We discuss this assumption in 3.5 below.
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in the state of the world ω. The definition of S implies that
{ω | λ(ω) ∈ B} ∈ Σ, for every open B ⊆ [0, 1)2.
– Pi : Ω → ∆(Ω) is a measurable function that assigns a belief for
player i to each state of the world ω. We denote by Pi(E | ω) the
probability that player i ascribes to the event E ⊆ Ω at the state
of the world ω, and by Ei(· | ω) the corresponding expectation
operator. Pi is measurable in the sense that for every E ⊆ Ω,
Pi(E | ·) is a measurable function. Pi is consistent, in the sense
that each player knows his belief: Pi({ω
′ : Pi(ω) = Pi(ω
′)} |
ω) = 1, for every ω ∈ Ω. We assume that Pi is such that each
player knows his own discount factor in every state of the world
ω: Pi({ω
′ : λi(ω
′) = λi(ω)} | ω) = 1 for every ω ∈ Ω. In Section
9.1 we drop this assumption.
Because Pi is consistent, it divides Ω into disjoint “types” of player i;
that is, into the sets
{
{ω′ | Pi(ω
′) = Pi(ω)}, ω ∈ Ω
}
. Denote by Σi ⊆ Σ
the σ-algebra generated by these sets, and by the sets {ω | λi(ω) ∈ B},
for every open set B ⊆ [0, 1) (since each player knows his own discount
factor, these sets are unions of his types). We will call a subset of Ω or
a function from Ω i-measurable if it is measurable with respect to Σi.
• Ai and ui are the same as in Γ: the set of pure actions of player i, and
his utility function (in each stage of the game), which are independent
of the state of the world.
A course of action of player i is function that assigns a mixed action
of player i to each finite history of actions in the game. This function is
independent of the state of the world. A strategy of player i is an i-measurable
function ηi that assigns a course of action ηi(ω) to each state of the world ω.
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The payoff of player i when the profile (ηi, ηj) is played, conditional on the
state of the world ω, is γi(ηi, ηj | ω) = Ei(
∑∞
t=1 λi(ω)
t−1uti | ω), where u
t
i is
the utility in stage t. The expectation4 depends on ω, since player j’s actions
and player i’s belief may depend on ω. As mentioned, we assume that the
discount factor λi is known to player i.
Recall that τ = (τ1, τ2) is a cooperative profile, and σ = (σ1, σ2) is a Nash
equilibrium with payoffs lower than those under τ .
Definition 2.1 A grim-trigger course of action for player i, based on σ
and τ , is the course of action τ ∗i under which player i plays τi until player j
deviates from τj, and from that stage on plays σi.
In the complete information case, there are thresholds λ01, λ
0
2 such that τ
∗ is
an equilibrium if and only if λi ≥ λ
0
i :
λ0i := min
{
λi |
ui(τ)
1− λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1− λi
) ≥ 0 ∀σ′i 6= τi
}
.
Denote Λi = {ω ∈ Ω | λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i }, which is the set of states in which player
i cannot profit by deviating from the profile τ ∗. Note that player i always
knows whether λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i or not: Λi is an i-measurable event.
We are interested only in “conditional-grim-trigger” strategies:
Definition 2.2 A strategy ηi of player i is called conditional-grim-trigger
strategy (with respect to σ and τ) if there is an i-measurable set Ki ⊆ Ω such
that:
ηi(ω) =

 τ
∗
i ω ∈ Ki
σ∗i ω /∈ Ki
4Note that this is actually the expected subjective payoff of player i, because the expec-
tation is taken with respect to his belief Pi(ω). This is the relevant payoff for the player’s
decision making. One could define the payoff as γi = Ei((1−λi(ω))
∑
∞
t=1 λi(ω)
t−1uti | ω).
Most of our results remain unchanged with this payoff function.
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Here σ∗i is the course of action where player i always plays σi. We denote
this strategy by η∗i (Ki).
Note that if a pair of grim-trigger strategies η∗(K1, K2) = (η
∗
1(K1), η
∗
2(K2))
is played, then, because τi is not in σi’s support, after the first stage both
players learn if the other player “cooperates”. From that point on they do
not learn anything else.
Definition 2.3 If η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium, the pair of events
(K1, K2) is called cooperation events.
The existence of non-empty cooperation events guarantees that the players
may cooperate in some states of the world.
Note that η∗(∅, ∅) is a Bayesian equilibrium in which the players always
follow σ. Also note that if η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium and Ki = ∅,
then Kj = ∅, since we assumed that τj is not a best response to σi.
3 Main Result: Characterization of the Co-
operation Events
3.1 The Complete Information Case
When the game has complete information we can identify S and Ω, and each
player knows the true state of the world.
Theorem 3.1 When the game G has complete information, η∗(K1, K2) is
a Bayesian equilibrium if and only if K1 = K2 ⊆ Λ where Λ = Λ1 ∩ Λ2 =
{λk ≥ λ
0
k for k = 1, 2}.
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Proof: Assume K1 = K2 ⊆ Λ. Then for every ω ∈ K1, the profile τ
∗ is
played, and both players know it. Since ω ∈ Λ, both λ1 ≥ λ
0
1 and λ2 ≥ λ
0
2,
so neither player can profit by deviating. For every ω /∈ K1, the profile σ
∗
is played, and both players know it. Since σ is a Nash equilibrium in Γ,
neither player can profit by deviating. For the opposite direction, there are
two cases: K1 = K2 6⊂ Λ and K1 6= K2. Assume first that K1 = K2 6⊂ Λ,
and let ω ∈ K1/Λ. Without loss of generality assume that λ1 < λ
0
1 in the
state of the world ω. In the state of the world ω the profile τ ∗ is played,
but since λ1 < λ
0
1, player 1 can profit by deviating, so η
∗(K1, K2) is not a
Bayesian equilibrium. Assume Now that ω ∈ K1/K2. Then in the state of
the world ω, player 1 knows that player 2 plays σ∗2 , and since τ1 is not a best
response to σ2, it is profitable for him to deviate from τ
∗
1 to σ
∗
1 , and therefore
η∗(K1, K2) is not a Bayesian equilibrium. 
Example 3.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma with complete information.
C
D
D C
0, 4
1, 1
3, 3
4, 0
Here σ = (D,D) and τ = (C,C). It can be easily calculated that λ01 = λ
0
2 =
1/3, and that η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium if and only if K1 = K2 ⊆
{λ1, λ2 ≥ 1/3}.
3.2 The Incomplete Information Case
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 3.3 Let Ki ⊆ Ω be an i measurable event for i = 1, 2, then the
strategy profile η∗(K1, K2) = (η
∗
1(K1), η
∗
2(K2)) is a Bayesian equilibrium if
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and only if ,for i = 1, 2, Ki ⊆ Λi and
1. Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki,
2. Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ gi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki,
for the i-measurable functions5
fi(ω) := maxσ′i∈Fi
ui(σ
′
i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
,
and
gi(ω) := min{g
1
i , g
2
i (ω), g
3
i (ω)},
where σ′i is an action of player i, and Fi = {σ
′
i | ui(τi, σj) < ui(σ
′
i, σj)}.
g1i , g
2
i (ω) and g
3
i (ω) are derived from different kinds of deviations, and are
defined by:
g1i := min
σ′i∈H
1
i
ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj)
(ui(σ)− ui(σ′i, σj)) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− ui(σi, τj))
where H1i := {σ
′
i 6= σi, τi | ui(σi, τj) < ui(σ
′
i, τj)},
g2i (ω) :=
ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)
(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) +
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
whenever ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
<
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
, and g2i (ω) := 1 otherwise,
and
g3i (ω) := minσ′i∈H3i (ω)
ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj)
(ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj))+(ui(τ)−ui(σi,τj)+(ui(σ′i,τj)−(ui(σ)))(λi(ω))
,
where
H3i (ω) := {σ
′
i 6= τi | ui(τ)− ui(σi, τj) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− (ui(σ)))λi(ω) < 0} .
5By definition, the infimum over an empty set is 1 and the supremum over an empty
set is 0.
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We now present an equivalent formulation of Theorem 3.3, using the
concept of f -belief and common-f -belief, which we define now.
Definition 3.4 Let N be a set of players and (Ω,Σ, λ, (Pi)i∈N) be a general
belief space on a measurable space of states of nature (S,S). Let f : ΩN → RN
be a measurable function, where fi is i-measurable for every i ∈ N . Let
A ⊆ Ω be an event. We say that player i f -believes in the event A at ω if
Pi(A | ω) ≥ fi(ω). We say that the event A is an common-f -belief at ω if
in the state of the world ω each player f -believes in A, f -believes that each
other player f -believes in A, f -believes that each other player f -believes that
each player f -believes in A, etc.
These two concepts generalize the concepts of p-belief and common-p-belief
described by Samet and Mondrer (1989). These concepts are discussed in
detail in Section 4.
The definitions imply that the conditions in Theorem 3.3 are equivalent
to the following:
1. Kj is an f -belief in Ki.
2. Kcj is an (1− g)-belief in K
c
i .
In Section 4 we prove that these conditions are also equivalent to the following
condition: each player either f -believes that K1 ∩K2 is a common-f -belief
or (1 − g)-believes that the event “K1 ∩K2 is not a common-f -belief” is a
common-(1− g)-belief (Theorem 4.6).
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Player i’s payoff under the strategy profile τ ∗ is γi(τ
∗) = ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
. As men-
tioned before, the strategy profile τ is not an equilibrium in the one-shot
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game, whereas σ is. If player i deviates from the profile τ ∗ and plays σ′i 6= τi
in the first stage, then from the second stage on player j will play σj , to
which σi will be player i’s best response. The expected payoff for player i
will then be ui(σ
′
i, τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
. If there is a profitable deviation from τ ∗
for player i, there is such a profitable deviation in the first stage. Therefore
λ0i := min
{
λi |
ui(τ)
1−λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1−λi
) ≥ 0 ∀σ′i 6= τi
}
, is the minimal
discount factor λi such that player i cannot gain by deviating from the profile
τ ∗.
We will now check player i’s options to deviate from the profile η∗(K1, K2).
Case 1: ω ∈ Ki.
Note that, because Ki is i-measurable, in this case Pi(Ki | ω) = 1.
Player i’s payoff under the strategy profile η∗(Ki, Kj) is
γi(η
∗(Ki, Kj) | ω) =
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
.
Indeed, according to player i’s belief, with probability Pi(Kj | ω) player j
plays τ ∗j , so they will play τ at every stage and his payoff will be
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
, and
with probability (1 − Pi(Kj | ω)) player j plays σ
∗
j so in the first stage the
profile played will be (τi, σj) and afterwards the players will play σ, so that
player i’s payoff will be ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
.
We now check the conditions that guarantee that player i cannot profit
by deviating:
• Because σ is an equilibrium, deviation after the first stage can be prof-
itable for player i only if player j played τj in the first stage. Also, in
that case, if it’s profitable to deviate in stage k > 2, it is also profitable
to deviate in stage k = 2, because when η∗(K1, K2) is played, the play-
ers do not learn anything from the second stage onwards. After the
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first deviation the best response to η∗j (Kj) is to play σi in all stages,
because player j will play σj . Denote by σ
′∗∗
i the course of action in
which player i plays τi in the first stage, an if player j played τj in
the first stage, player i plays a pure action σ′i 6= τi in stage 2 and σi
afterwards. If player j played σj in the first stage, player i plays σi
from the second stage onwards. The payoff is:
γi(σ
′∗∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(τ) + ui(σ
′
i, τj)λi(ω) + ui(σ)
λ2i (ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
+
+(1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
.
So that η∗(K1, K2) is an equilibrium we should have γi(η
∗(K1, K2) |
ω) ≥ γi(σ
′∗∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) for all σ
′
i 6= τi, and therefore,
Pi(Kj | ω)λi(ω)
(
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
)
≥ 0,
for every σ′i 6= τi. Because λi > 0, either Pi(Kj | ω) = 0 or ω ∈ Λi.
• Player i can also deviate in the first stage to a pure strategy σ′i 6= τi.
As before, after the deviation his best response to η∗j is to play σi in all
stages. His payoff in this case is (denote by σ∗i the course of action of
player i that plays σ′i 6= τi at stage 1 and σi thereafter):
γi(σ
′∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) = Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
+
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(σ
′
i, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
.
In order for η∗(K1, K2) to be an equilibrium we should have
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(σ
′∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω), and therefore, for every σ
′
i 6=
τi:
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
)
+
+(1− Pi(Kj | ω))(ui(τi, σj)− ui(σ
′
i, σj)) ≥ 0. (1)
16
Because τi is not a best response to σj , Pi(Kj | ω) > 0, otherwise
inequality (1) becomes ui(τi, σj) − ui(σ
′
i, σj) ≥ 0 for every σ
′
i 6= τi in
contradiction. As above we deduce, that ω ∈ Λi, or Ki ⊆ Λi. There-
fore we get that ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
) ≥ 0. Therefore, if
ui(τi, σj) ≥ ui(σ
′
i, σj) inequality 1 trivially holds. Otherwise we obtain:
Pi(Kj | ω) ≥
ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
.
or Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) where fi(ω) is defined by:
fi(ω) := maxσ′i∈Fi
ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
,
where Fi = {σ
′
i | ui(τi, σj) < ui(σ
′
i, σj)}.
Case 2: ω /∈ Ki.
Player i’s payoff under the strategy profile η∗(K1, K2) is
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) = (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
ui(σ)
1− λi(ω)
+
+ Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
.
• Player i can deviate to the strategy σ′∗i described above (σ
′
i may be in
the support of σ. See remark 3.6(1)). His payoff in this case is:
γi(σ
′∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) = Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(σ
′
i, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
.
So that η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium, we should have
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(σ
′∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω), that is
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
(ui(σi, τj)− ui(σ
′
i, τj))− (ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj))
)
+
+(ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj)) ≥ 0. (2)
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The last term on the left side of inequality (2) is non-negative since σ is
an equilibrium. Therefore, if ui(σi, τj) ≥ ui(σ
′
i, τj) inequality 2 trivially
holds. Inequality (2) is equivalent to Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
1
i , where
g1i := min
σ′i∈H
1
i
ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj)
(ui(σ)− ui(σ′i, σj)) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− ui(σi, τj))
,
and H1i := {σ
′
i 6= σi, τi | ui(σi, τj) < ui(σ
′
i, τj)}. Note that g
1
i is inde-
pendent of ω and the inequality is independent of λi(ω).
• Player i can deviate to τ ∗i . In this case his payoff is:
γi(τ
∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) = Pi(Kj | ω)
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
+
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
.
Because γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(τ
∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω):
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
−
(
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
)
−
−(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj))) + (ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) ≥ 0. (3)
As before, ui(σ) − ui(τi, σj) ≥ 0. Unless ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
−(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
< 0 inequality (3) trivially holds. Therefore inequality (3) is
equivalent to Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
2
i (ω), where
g2i (ω) :=
ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)
(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) +
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
whenever ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
<
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
, and g2i (ω) := 1 oth-
erwise.
• Player i can play the following strategy σ′ki :
– Play τi in the first stage.
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– If j played τj in the first stage, play τi until stage k + 1 and then
play a pure σ′i 6= τi, and afterwards σi.
– If j played σj in the first stage, player i’s best response is σi from
stage 2 onwards.
The payoff is:
γi(σ
′k
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(τ)
1−(λi(ω))
k
1−λi(ω)
+ ui(σ
′
i, τj)(λi(ω))
k + ui(σ)
(λi(ω))
k+1
1−λi(ω)
)
+
+(1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
.
Note that γi(σ
′k
i , η
∗
j | ω) = A(λi(ω))
k + B for some constants A and
B, independent of k. Therefore, as a function of k, γi(σ
′k
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω)
is monotonic. If it is increasing, it is smaller than the payoff in the
previous case (playing τ ∗i ). If it is decreasing, γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥
γi(σ
′k
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) if and only if the inequality holds for k = 1. There-
fore, we only need to consider the case of k = 1:
Pi(Kj | ω) (ui(τi, σj)− ui(σ) + ui(σi, τj)− ui(τ)+
+(ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, τj))(λi(ω))) + (ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) ≥ 0. (4)
If ui(τ)−ui(σi, τj)+(ui(σ
′
i, τj)−(ui(σ)))λi(ω) ≥ 0 inequality (4) trivially
holds. Therefore inequality (4) is equivalent to Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
3
i (ω),
where
g3i (ω) := minσ′i∈H3i (ω)
ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj)
(ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj))+(ui(τ)−ui(σi,τj)+(ui(σ′i,τj)−(ui(σ)))(λi(ω))
,
and
H3i (ω) := {σ
′
i 6= τi | ui(τ)− ui(σi, τj) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− (ui(σ)))λi(ω) < 0} .
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Then gi(ω) := min{g
1
i , g
2
i (ω), g
3
i (ω)}. Last, we need to prove that fi and
gi are i measurable. Both of them are rational functions (or segment-wise
rational functions) of λi, and therefore, as functions of λi, they are Borel
functions. Since Σi contains {ω | λi(ω) ∈ B}, for every open set B ⊆ [0, 1),
fi and gi, as functions of ω, are i-measurable. 
Remark 3.5 1. If τi is in the support of σi, player i cannot lose by play-
ing τi in every ω: τi is a best response to σj in this case, and player j
cannot (in this mechanism) discern the deviation and punish. There-
fore, in this case, in order for η∗(K1, K2) to be an equilibrium, it is
necessary that Pi(Kj | ω) = 0 for every ω /∈ Ki. Also, in this case Ki
is not necessarily a subset of Λi — see next remark.
2. If τi is a best response to σj, Ki may not be a subset of Λi since we
cannot conclude from inequality (1) that Pi(Kj | ω) > 0, and therefore
we only get that Ki ⊆ Λi ∪ {ω | Pi(Kj | ω) = 0}. Moreover, in
this case (and this case only) inequality (1) trivially holds for every
ω ∈ Λi ∪ {ω | Pi(Kj | ω) = 0} — there is no non-trivial condition on
Pi(Kj | ω) that needs to hold for ω ∈ Ki. Also, in this case gi(ω) may be
0 even if τi isn’t in the support of σi because g
3
i (ω) and g
2
i (ω) are either
1 or 0 (this follows from their definition because ui(σ) = ui(τi, σj)). See
Example 3.7.
Remark 3.6 1. If there is a best response σ′i to σj which is a better re-
sponse to τj than σi, then gi ≡ 0 (and then we need Pi(Kj | ω) = 0 for
every ω /∈ Ki), even if τi is a best response to σj, because then g
1
i = 0.
Note that this condition depends only on the structure of Γ, and not on
the information structure. From this we deduce that if σi is not pure,
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then gi ≡ 0 unless ui(σ
′
i, τj) = ui(σ
′′
i , τj) for every σ
′
i, σ
′′
i in the support
of σi.
2. Under the assumption that ui(τi, σi) < ui(σ), we have fi > 0. Note
that fi(ω) ≤ 1 for ω ∈ Λi, and it can be defined as needed outside this
set, see the following remark.
3. Note that the definition of fi outside Ki and the definition of gi inside
Ki for i = 1, 2 is irrelevant for Theorem 3.3.
In the following example we show that if τi is a best response to σj ,
η∗(K1, K2) may be an equilibrium even if K1 ⊃ Λ1 (a strict inclusion). In
particular, the assumption that τi is not a best response to σj is necessary
for Theorem 3.3.
Example 3.7 Consider the following game:
C
D
D C
1, 4
1, 1
3, 3
4, 1
As in Example 3.2, σ = (D,D), τ = (C,C), and λ01 = λ
0
2 = 1/3 (the
payoff of player i when he plays C and player j plays D is irrelevant for
the calculation of λ0i , as long as (C,C) remains a Nash equilibrium). Let
Ω = {1/4, 3/4}2, with λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω)) = ω. In any state of the world
ω, player i knows only the coordinate i of ω (his own discount factor). If
ωi = 1/4, player i believes that ω = (1/4, 1/4) (i.e., that both discount factors
are 1/4). If ωi = 3/4, player i believes that ωj = 1/4 or ωj = 3/4 with equal
probability. From λ01 = λ
0
2 = 1/3 we have that Λ1 = {3/4} × {1/4, 3/4}
and Λ2 = {1/4, 3/4} × {3/4}. We now show that η
∗(Ω,Λ2) is a Bayesian
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equilibrium: Player 1 plays τ ∗1 in every state of the world, and player 2
plays τ ∗2 if ω2 = 3/4, and always defects otherwise. Therefore, if ω1 = 1/4,
player 1 believes that ω2 = 1/4, so that player 2 always plays D, and in this
case player 1 gains 1 in each stage regardless of his actions. If ω1 = 3/4,
player 1 believes that in probability 1/2 player 2 always plays D, so the same
argument as before holds, and in probability 1/2 player 2 plays τ ∗2 . Because
ω1 = 3/4 > λ
0
1, player 1 cannot profit from deviating from τ
∗. Therefore,
player 1 cannot profit by deviation. Player 2 knows that player 1 plays τ1.
If ω2 = 3/4 he plays τ2, and since 3/4 > λ
0
2 he cannot profit from deviating.
If ω2 = 1/4, player 2 plays D in every stage. He cannot profit from playing
τ ∗2 , since 1/4 < λ
0
2. Last, as shown in the proof to Theorem 3.3, we need to
check that he cannot profit by deviating to σ12, and indeed inequality (4) holds
in this case (for σ′2 = σ2 = D). Therefore, η
∗(Ω,Λ2) is indeed a Bayesian
equilibrium.
4 Constructing the Cooperation Events
In this section we construct the cooperation events K1 and K2 so they will
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.3.
4.1 Preliminaries — Belief Operators
In this section we study the concepts f -belief and common-f -belief, as de-
fined in Definition 3.4. This subsection is valid for general belief spaces, not
only regarding the model of incomplete information regarding the discount
factors (see definition 10.1 in Zamir-Maschler-Solan for a formal definition of
a general belief space).
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Definition 4.1 The f -belief operator of player i is the operator Bfi : Σ→
Σ that assigns to each event the states of the world at which player i f -believes
in the event: Bfi (A) := {ω ∈ Ω | Pi(A | ω) ≥ fi(ω)}.
If fi is a constant function, and fi = fj for every i and j, then the concept
of f -belief reduces to the concept of p-belief of Mondrer and Samet (1989).
If fi is a constant function pi, but not necessarily pi = pj for every i and j,
then the concept of f -belief reduces to the concept of p-belief of Morris and
Kajii (1997). Similar to the analysis of Mondrer and Samet, we prove the
following:
Proposition 4.2 Let Bfi be an f -belief operator. The following hold:
1. If A,B ∈ Σ and A ⊆ B, then Bfi (A) ⊆ B
f
i (B).
2. If A ∈ Σ then Bfi (B
f
i (A)) = B
f
i (A).
3. If (An)
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence of events then B
f
i (
⋂∞
n=1An) =⋂∞
n=1B
f
i (An).
4. If C ∈ Σ is an i-measurable event, then Bfi (C) = (C \{ω ∈ Ω | fi(ω) >
1}) ∪ {ω ∈ Ω | fi(ω) ≤ 0}.
5. If fi > 0 or {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ C then B
f
i (A)∩C = B
f
i (A∩C) for every event
A ∈ Σ and i-measurable event C ∈ Σ.
Proof: The proof of parts 1 and 3 is similar to the proof for Proposition
2 in Mondrer and Samet (for p-belief operators). To prove part 4, observe
that for every ω ∈ C, Pi(C | ω) = 1 and for every ω /∈ C, Pi(C | ω) =
0. Part 2 follows from part 4, because for every A ∈ Σ, Bfi (A) is an i-
measurable event (since fi and Pi(A | ·) are i-measurable), which contains
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{ω ∈ Ω | fi(ω) ≤ 0}. To prove part 5, assume {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ C. In this
case Bfi (C) = C \ {fi > 1}. Assume ω ∈ B
f
i (A ∩ C). From part 1 we
have ω ∈ Bfi (A) and ω ∈ B
f
i (C) ⊆ C. For the opposite direction, assume
ω ∈ Bfi (A) ∩ C. Then Pi(A | ω) ≥ fi(ω) and Pi(C | ω) = 1 and therefore
Pi(A ∩ C | ω) ≥ fi(ω), that is, ω ∈ B
f
i (A ∩ C). 
We say that C is a common-f -belief at a state of the world ω if in the
state of the world ω each player f -believes C, f -believes that the other
players f -believe C, f -believes that they f -believe that he f -believes C,
etc. Therefore, C is a common-f -belief at ω, then ω ∈
⋂
i∈N B
f
i (C), ω ∈⋂
k∈N B
f
k (
⋂
i∈N B
f
i (C)), and so on. In particular, if we define D
0(C) := C,
Dn+1(C) :=
⋂
i∈N B
f
i (D
n(C)) for every n ≥ 0, and Df(C) :=
⋂
n≥1D
n(C)
we get that “C is a common-f -belief is ω” is equivalent to ω ∈ Df(C). The
event Df(C) is called C is a common-f -belief.
By Proposition 4.2, Bfi is a belief operator as defined by Mondrer and
Samet (1989), and therefore we get:
Proposition 4.3 Let C ∈ Σ, ω ∈ Ω. The following definition of “C is an
common-f -belief at a state of the world ω” is equivalent to the Definition 3.4:
C is a common-f -belief at ω if and only if there exist an event D ∈ Σ such
that ω ∈ D, and D ⊆ Bfi (C) and D ⊆ B
f
i (D) for every i ∈ N .
4.2 Constructing the Cooperation Events
Now we go back to the incomplete information structure as defined in Section
2.
Definition 4.4 For every two events Ci ∈ Σ, i = 1, 2, defineD
1,f
i (Ci, Cj) :=
Bfi (Cj) ∩ Ci. For n > 1, define
Dn,fi (Ci, Cj) := B
f
i (D
n−1,f
j (Cj, Ci)) ∩D
n−1,f
i (Ci, Cj), and
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Dfi (Ci, Cj) :=
⋂
n≥1D
n,f
i (Ci, Cj).
The definition of Dfi (Ci, Cj) is similar (though not identical) to the defi-
nition of iterated p-belief of player i in Morris (1999).
As the next Lemma states, Df1 (C1, C2) and D
f
2 (C2, C1) are the largest
subsets of C1 and C2 (respectively), such that the first inequality in Theorem
3.3 holds:
Lemma 4.5 1. For every ω ∈ Dfi (Ci, Cj), one has Pi(D
f
j (Cj , Ci) | ω) ≥
fi(ω) for i = 1, 2. D
f
1 (C1, C2) and D
f
2 (C2, C1) are the largest subsets of
C1 and C2 (respectively) such that this property holds.
6
2. If Ci is i-measurable so is D
f
i (Ci, Cj), for every Cj ∈ Σ.
3. If Ci is i-measurable and {fi ≤ 0} ⊆ Ci for i = 1, 2, then D
n,f
i (Ci, Cj)
and Dfi (Ci, Cj) depend only on the intersection of Ci and Cj. In this
case, Df1 (C1, C2)∩D
f
2 (C2, C1) = D
f(C1 ∩C2), the event containing all
state of the world ω such that C1 ∩ C2 is a common-f -belief at ω, and
Dfi (Ci, Cj) = B
f
i (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)), the event event containing all state of
the world ω such that player i f -believes that C1 ∩ C2 is a common-f -
belief.
Note that part 3 holds when f1 > 0 and f2 > 0, and in particular to
p-belief for p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof:
6They are the largest in the following (strong) sense: if K1 ⊆ C1 and K2 ⊆ C2 fulfill
∀ω ∈ Ki Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for i = 1, 2 then Ki ⊆ D
f
i (Ci, Cj).
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1. We first argue that Dfi ⊆ B
f
i (D
f
j ). Indeed, by Proposition 4.2(3), and
since (Dn,fj )
∞
n=1 is a decreasing sequence of events,
Bfi (D
f
j ) = B
f
i
(⋂
n≥1
Dn,fj
)
=
⋂
n≥1
Bfi (D
n,f
j ) ⊃
⋂
n≥1
Bfi (D
n,f
j ) ∩D
n,f
i =
=
⋂
n≥1
Dn+1,fi = D
f
i .
Here Dfi = D
f
i (Ci, Cj) and D
n,f
i = D
n,f
i (Ci, Cj). For the maximality
property, assume that that K1 ⊆ C1 and K2 ⊆ C2 fulfill Pi(Kj | ω) ≥
fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki and i = 1, 2. Therefore Ki ⊆ B
f
i (Kj) from
which follows D1,fi (Ki, Kj) = Ki and therefore D
f
i (Ki, Kj) = Ki. Be-
cause Ki ⊆ Ci it follows, from Proposition 4.2(1) that D
f
i (Ki, Kj) ⊆
Dfi (Ci, Cj).
2. This follows from the fact that Bfi (C) is i-measurable for every C ∈ Σ,
and because the intersection of countably many i-measurable sets is
i-measurable.
3. Denote C := C1 ∩ C2. By Proposition 4.2(5) one has D
1
i (Ci, Cj) :=
Bfi (C). This proves the first claim. Because D
1
i (Ci, Cj) := B
f
i (C),
it can be verified from the definition of that for n ≥ 1, Dn(C) =
Dn1 (C1, C2)∩D
n
2 (C2, C1) and thereforeD
f(C) = Df1 (C1, C2)∩D
f
2 (C2, C1).
The event “player i f -believes that C1 ∩ C2 is a common-f -belief” is
the event
Bfi (D
f(C)) = Bfi (D
f
1 (C1, C2) ∩D
f
2 (C2, C1)) =
= Bfi (Dj(Cj, Ci)) ∩D
f
i (Ci, Cj) = D
f
i (Ci, Cj).
The second equality follows from the second part of this lemma and
Proposition 4.2(5), and the last one from the first part of this lemma.
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Using Lemma 4.5 and Proposition 3.3 we get the following result:
Theorem 4.6 For every two events C1 and C2, such that Ci ⊆ Λi, for i =
1, 2, and Ci is measurable according to the information of player i, the strat-
egy profile η∗(Bf1 (D
f(C1∩C2), B
f
2 (D
f(C1∩C2))) is a Bayesian equilibrium if
and only if Bfi (D
f (C1∩C2))
c = B1−gi (D
1−g(Bfi (D
f(C1∩C2))
c∩Bfj (D
f(C1∩
C2))
c)). Moreover, (Bfi (D
f(C1 ∩C2)))
2
i=1 are the maximal subsets of (Ci)
2
i=1
with this property - if there is i such that Bfi (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)) ⊂ Ki ⊆ Ci, then
η∗(K1, K2) is not an equilibrium.
The opposite is also true: if η∗(K1, K2) is an equilibrium, then B
f
i (D
f(Ki∩
Kj)) = Ki and B
1−g
i (D
1−g(Kci ∩K
c
j )) = K
c
i .
In other words, η∗(K1, K2) is an equilibrium if and only if each player
either f -believes at ω that K1∩K2 is a common-f -belief at ω or 1−g-believes
at ω that the event “K1∩K2 is not a common-f -belief” is a common-(1−g)-
belief at ω, for every state of the world ω ∈ Ω.
Also, if Ki = B
f
i (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)) (i = 1, 2) for some Ki ⊆ Ci ⊆ Λi, then
each player either f -believes at ω that C1 ∩C2 is a common-f -belief at ω or
1 − g-believes at ω that the event “C1 ∩ C2 is not a common-f -belief” is a
common-(1− g)-belief at ω, for every state of the world ω ∈ Ω.
This theorem shows that the argument that infinite number of conditions
of the type “each player needs to ascribe high enough probability that the
other player ascribes high enough probability that his own discount factor
is higher than...” are needed, as was discussed in the introduction, holds.
It is equivalent to the condition that in Ki player i f -believes Kj at ω for
every ω ∈ Ki for both i = 1 and i = 2. Also, as the theorem states, a similar
condition is required for every ω /∈ Ki.
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Proof: Denote C = C1∩C2. From Remark 3.6(3), we can assure that {fi ≤
0} ⊆ Dfi (Ci, Cj) and {1 − gi ≤ 0} ⊆ D
f
i (Ci, Cj)
c. Therefore, Lemma 4.5(3)
holds, so Dfi (Ci, Cj) = B
f
i (D
f(C)) and D1−gi (D
f
i (Ci, Cj)
c, Dfj (Cj, Ci)
c) =
B1−gi (D
1−g(Bfi (D
f(C))c∩Bfj (D
f(C))c)). Because Dfi (Ci, Cj) = B
f
i (D
f(C)),
we know from Lemma 4.5(1) that the first condition in Proposition 3.3 holds,
and that there are no larger subsets of C1, C2 such that it holds. Therefore,
η∗(Bf1 (D
f(C), Bf2 (D
f(C))) is an equilibrium if and only if the second con-
dition holds. That is, for every ω /∈ Bfi (D
f(C)) one has Pi(B
f
j (D
f(C)) |
ω) ≤ gi(ω) which is equivalent to Pi(B
f
j (D
f(C))c | ω) ≥ 1 − gi(ω) for ev-
ery ω ∈ Bfi (D
f(C))c or Dfi (Ci, Cj)
c = Bfi (D
f(C))c ⊆ B1−gi (D
f
j (Cj , Ci)
c) =
B1−gi (B
f
j (D
f(C))c). From that we get
Bfi (D
f(C))c = Dfi (Ci, Cj)
c = D1,1−gi (D
f
i (Ci, Cj)
c, Dfj (Cj, Ci)
c),
for i = 1, 2, which implies that
Dfi (Ci, Cj)
c = Dn,1−gi (D
f
i (Ci, Cj)
c, Dfj (Cj, Ci)
c),
so that
Dfi (Ci, Cj)
c = D1−gi (D
f
i (Ci, Cj)
c, Dfj (Cj , Ci)
c) =
= B1−gi (D
1−g(Bfi (D
f(C))c ∩ Bfj (D
f(C))c)).
For the second part, observe that Bfi (D
f(Ki ∩ Kj)) = Ki follows from
Lemma 4.5(1): Bfi (D
f(Ki ∩ Kj)) = D
f
i (Ki, Kj) is the biggest subset of Ki
such the first condition in Proposition 3.3 holds. But since η∗(K1, K2) is an
equilibrium it holds for Ki. Similarly, B
1−g
i (D
1−g(Kci ∩K
c
j )) = D
1−g
i (K
c
i , K
c
j )
is the biggest subset of Kci such that the second condition in Proposition 3.3
holds, and therefore B1−gi (D
1−g(Kci ∩K
c
j )) = K
c
i . 
Example 4.7 Recall that Λi = {λi(·) ≥ λ
0
i }. So, if we take Ci = Λi, then
η∗(Λ1,Λ2) is an equilibrium if and only if whenever a player does not f -believe
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that ”λ1 and λ2 are high enough” is a common-f -belief, he (1 − g)-believes
that the fact that this is not a common-f -belief is a common-(1− g)-belief.
5 Prisoner’s Dilemma
We now apply the results from previous chapters to the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
thus expanding Example 3.2.
First we will observe the following regarding a larger class of games:
Lemma 5.1 Assume player i has only two actions σi and τi. Then g
1
i = 1,
for ω /∈ Λi, g
2
i (ω) = g
3
i (ω) = 1, and for ω ∈ Λi, g
2
i (ω) = fi(ω) ≤ g
3
i (ω).
Proof: H1i = ∅, and therefore g
1
i = 1. Because there are only two actions,
Λi =
{
ω ∈ Ω | ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
) ≥ 0
}
, and therefore if ω /∈
Λi then from the definition of g
2
i it follows that g
2
i (ω) = 1. If ω ∈ Λi, it follows
that g2i (ω) = fi(ω). In this case the inequality g
2
i (ω) ≤ g
3
i (ω) can be checked
arithmetically, but one can observe that if ω ∈ Λi then player i does not
profit by deviating when the profile τ ∗ is played, therefore the deviation that
leads to g2i is more profitable for him then the deviation that leads to g
3
i .
Because Λi =
{
ω ∈ Ω | ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
) ≥ 0
}
, if ω /∈
Λi we have
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
) < 0 or ui(τ) − ui(σi, τj)(1 −
λi(ω))− ui(σ)λi(ω) < 0, which implies that H
3
i = ∅. 
Corollary 5.2 1. Let Ci ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2. If both players have only
two actions, then to verify that η∗(Bf1 (D
f(C1 ∩C2)), B
f
2 (D
f(C1∩C2)))
is a Bayesian equilibrium, one only needs to verify that Pi(B
f
j (D
f(C1∩
C2)) | ω) ≤ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Λi \B
f
1 (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)) for i = 1, 2.
2. η∗(Bf1 (D
f(Λ)), Bf2 (D
f(Λ))) is an equilibrium.
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Note that in the last case both players cooperate whenever the fact that both
players have high enough discount factor is a common-f -belief.
Proof:
1. This follows from Theorem 3.3, Lemma 4.5(1) and Lemma 5.1.
2. Assume there exists ω∗ ∈ Λ1 \ B
f
1 (D
f(Λ)) such that P1(B
f
2 (D
f(Λ) |
ω∗) > f1(ω
∗). Denote K1 := B
f
1 (D
f(Λ) ∪ {ω∗} and K2 := B
f
2 (D
f(Λ).
From the assumption, Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki for i = 1, 2,
in contradiction to the maximality property of Dfi (Λi,Λj) = B
f
i (D
f(Λ)
as shown in Lemma 4.5(1). 
Remark 5.3 If we define fi to be at least 1 outside Λi (see Remark 3.6(3)),
Corrolary 5.2 holds for every game which satisfies fi ≥ gi for i = 1, 2.
It is easy to calculate that for Prisoner’s Dilemma with the payoffs as in
Example 3.2, fi(ω) =
1−λi(ω)
2λi(ω)
. Therefore, from the last corollary we have:
Corollary 5.4 Let G be the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma where each player
has incomplete information regarding the other player’s discount factor. De-
fine fi(ω) =
1−λi(ω)
2λi(ω)
. Then the pair of strategies where each player plays as
follows: If you f -believe that it is a common-f -belief that λ1, λ2 ≥
1
3
, play the
grim-trigger course of action. Otherwise, always defect, is an equilibrium.
Therefore, both players will cooperate when λ1, λ2 ≥
1
3
is a common-f -belief.
Note that there cannot be larger events than Bf1 (D
f(Λ)), Bf2 (D
f(Λ)) such
that the strategy profile η∗ is an equilibrium, but it may be an equilibrium
with smaller ones. See next section for examples.
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6 Examples
In all the examples in this section, Ω ⊆ [0, 1)2, and we interpret the coordi-
nates of ω ∈ Ω as the players’ discount factors, i.e. λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω)) =
ω. In all the examples each player knows his own discount factor (i.e., player
i knows coordinate i of ω), and their belief regarding the other player’s dis-
count factor depends only on their own discount factor.
In examples 6.1-6.4, G is the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, with different
information structures. In these examples corollaries 5.2 and 5.4 hold.
In the following example Bfi (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅, and therefore we get the equi-
librium of Corollary 5.4, but we can also get an equilibrium with smaller
sets.
Example 6.1 Let Ω = {1/4, 1/2, 3/4}2, and each player assumes a uniform
distribution on the other player’s discount factor (regardless of his own dis-
count factor). Equivalently, there is a common-prior of uniform distribution
on Ω.
Because λ01 = λ
0
2 = 1/3, it follows that Λ1 = {1/2, 3/4} × {1/4, 1/2, 3/4}
and Λ2 = {1/4, 1/2, 3/4} × {1/2, 3/4}. Therefore we get that for every ω,
P1(Λ2 | ω) = 2/3. Since f1(3/4) < f1(1/2) =
1−1/2
2·1/2
= 1/2 < 2/3 we get
D1,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1. Similarly, D
1,f
2 (Λ2,Λ1) = Λ2, and therefore B
f
1 (D
f(Λ)) =
Df1 (Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1. From Corollary 5.4 we get that
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi = 1/2, 3/4,
σi λi = 1/4,
defines a Bayesian equilibrium.
Set C1 = {3/4} × {1/4, 1/2, 3/4} and C2 = {1/4, 1/2, 3/4} × {3/4},
then P1(C2 | ω) = 1/3 for every ω. Since f1(3/4) = 1/6 > 1/3, we get
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D1,f1 (C1, C2) = C1. Similarly, D
1,f
2 (C2, C1) = C2 ,and therefore B
f
i (D
f(C1 ∩
C2)) = D
f
i (Ci, Cj) = Ci. To use Corollary 5.1(1) we need to verify that
Pi(Cj | ω) ≤ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Λi \ Ci. If ω ∈ Λi \ Ci then λi(ω) = 1/2,
and indeed in Pi(Cj | ω) = 1/3 < 1/2 = fi(1/2). Therefore,
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi = 3/4,
σi λi = 1/4, 1/2,
also defines a Bayesian equilibrium.
In the following example Bfi (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅, and therefore we get the equi-
librium of Corollary 5.4, but there are no smaller non-empty sets that define
a Bayesian equilibrium.
Example 6.2 Let Ω and λ be as in the Example 6.1, but change the beliefs
as follows for i = 1, 2: If λi = 3/4, player i believes that λj = 3/4, if
λi = 1/2 he believes that λj = 1/2 with probability 1/3 and that λj = 3/4
with probability 2/3, and if λi = 1/4 he believes that λj is uniform distributed
over {1/4, 1/2, 3/4}. Thus, each player believes that the other player has a
discount factor at least as high as his own.
Λi is the same as in Example 6.1, and B
f
i (D
f(Λ)) = Λi so that
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi = 1/2, 3/4,
σi λi = 1/4,
defines a Bayesian equilibrium.
If we take Ci as in Example 6.1 we still get B
f
i (D
f(C1 ∩ C2)) = Ci, but
now Pi(Cj | ω) = 2/3 > 1/2 = fi(ω) for ω ∈ Λi \ Ci. Therefore
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi = 3/4,
σi λi = 1/4, 1/2,
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does not define a Bayesian equilibrium. Similarly, η∗(K1, K2) is not a
Bayesian equilibrium for any non-empty i-measurable events Ki ⊂ Λi (a
strict subset), i = 1, 2.
In the following example Bfi (D
f(Λ)) = ∅, and therefore there is no
Bayesian equilibrium with cooperation of the type described here.
Example 6.3 Let Ω = {1/4, 2/5}2, and λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω)) = ω. Each
player knows his own discount factor, and if λi = 2/5 player i believes that
λj = 1/4 with probability higher than 1−fi(2/5) = 1/4 (the rest of the beliefs
are irrelevant). Here Λi = {λi(·) = 2/5}, and so Pi(Λj | ω) < 1/4 = fi(ω)
for ω ∈ Λi. Therefore D
1,f
i (Λi,Λj) = ∅ and B
f
i (D
f(Λ)) = Dfi (Λi,Λj) = ∅,
so that we do not get an equilibrium with cooperation of the type η∗ (because
Dfi (Λi,Λj) is the largest set where such an equilibrium is possible, and here
it is empty, we cannot get it for any set). Note that according to Corollary
5.2 η∗(Bf1 (D
f(Λ)), Bf2 (D
f(Λ))) is an equilibrium, but in this case, because
Df(Λ) = ∅, it’s the trivial equilibrium in which the players always defect in
every state of the world ω.
In the following example Bfi (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅ but Bfi (D
f(Λ)) 6= Λi, as was in
the previous examples whenever Bfi (D
f(Λ)) was non-empty.
Example 6.4 Let Ω = (0, 1)2, and assume that each player believes that the
other player’s discount factor is uniformly distributed, regardless of his own
discount factor. Σ is the Borel σ-algebra over (0, 1)2. Σ1 contains the sets
B× (0, 1), for every Borel set B ⊆ (0, 1), and Σ2 contains the sets (0, 1)×B,
for every Borel set B ⊆ (0, 1).
Here Λ1 = [1/3, 1) × (0, 1) and Λ2 = (0, 1) × [1/3, 1). We will see that
Bf1 (D
f(Λ)) = [1/2, 1) × (0, 1), i.e., a strict subset of Λ1 (and an analog
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statement holds for player 2): because P1(Λ2 | ω) = 2/3 for every ω, and
f1(3/7) = 2/3 we deduce that D
1,f
1 (Λ1,Λ2) = [3/7, 1) × (0, 1). Therefore
P1(D
1,f
2 | ω) = 4/7 for every ω, and because f1(7/15) = 4/7 we deduce
that D2,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) = [7/15, 1) × (0, 1). We continue the same way and de-
duce that for every k there is n such that Dk,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) =
[
n
2n+1
, 1
)
× (0, 1):
P1(D
k
2 | ω) = 1−
n
2n+1
for every ω, and because f1
(
2n+1
2(2n+1)+1
)
= 1− n
2n+1
we
deduce that Dk+1,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) =
[
2n+1
2(2n+1)+1
, 1
)
× (0, 1). Therefore Bf1 (D
f(Λ)) =
Df1 (Λ1,Λ2) =
⋂
n≥1D
k,f
1 = [1/2, 1)× (0, 1). One can easily check that indeed
Pi(B
f
j (D
f(Λ)) | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ B
f
i (D
f(Λ)) for i = 1, 2. Note that
here the construction of Dfi requires an infinite number of steps - for every
k we have Dk+1,fi 6= D
k,f
i .
From Corollary 5.4 we deduce that
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi ≥ 1/2,
σi λi < 1/2,
defines a Bayesian equilibrium.
In examples 6.5-6.6, G is the following repeated game:
C
D
D C
N
N
0, ·
0, 4
1, 1
a, ·
3, 3
4, 0
·, ·
·, a
·, 0
with a > 4 (payoffs not indicated can be arbitrary). Here σ = (D,D),
τ = (C,C), and λ01 = λ
0
2 =
a−3
a−1
. In these examples Theorem 4.6 holds, with
fi(ω) = g
2
i (ω) =
1−λi(ω)
2λi(ω)
, g1i =
1
a−3
and g3i (ω) =
1
(a−1)λi(ω)
.
In the following example Bfi (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2 but these sets does
not satisfy the conditions in Theorem 4.6 (or equivalently those in Theorem
34
3.3). Moreover, we prove that in this example there are no non-empty K1, K2
such that η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Example 6.5 Let a = 6, the belief space as in Example 6.4. Here Λ1 =
[3/5, 1) × (0, 1) and Λ2 = (0, 1) × [3/5, 1), and because fi(ω) ≤ fi(3/5) =
1/3 < 1 − 3/5 = Pi(Λj | ω) for every ω ∈ Λi, D
1
i (Λi,Λj) = Λi and therefore
Dfi (Λi,Λj) = Λi. But, for ω /∈ Λi, Pi(λj | ω) = 2/5 > 1/3 = g
1
i ≥ gi(ω)
and therefore the second condition of Proposition 3.3 does not hold, and
η∗(Bf1 (D
f(Λ), Bf2 (D
f(Λ)))) does not define a Bayesian equilibrium, unlike
previous examples.
Now we prove that there are no non-empty K1, K2 such that η
∗(K1, K2) is
a Bayesian equilibrium. Suppose that η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium,
and that K1, K2 are non-empty cooperation events. Denote, for i = 1, 2,
λ∗i := inf{λi(ω) | ω ∈ Ki}. Since Ki ⊆ Λi, λ
∗
i ≥ 3/5. Note that since the
beliefs are derived from the uniform distribution, Pi(Kj | ω) is independent of
the state of the world ω, so we denote it by Pi(Kj). From the first inequality
of Theorem 3.3, we have Pi(Kj) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki, and since fi is
continuous, Pi(Kj) ≥ fi(λ
∗
i ). We now argue that if λi(ω) > λ
∗
i , then ω ∈ Ki.
Otherwise we have, from the second inequality of Theorem 3.3, that Pi(Kj) ≤
gi(ω) ≤ g
2
i (ω) = fi(ω). But fi(ω) < fi(λ
∗
i ) ≤ Pi(Kj), since λi(ω) > λ
∗
i , in
contradiction. Therefore we have that Pi(Kj) = 1− λ
∗
j . Next, we argue that
Pi(Kj) = fi(λ
∗
i ). Otherwise Pi(Kj) > fi(λ
∗
i ), and there is a state of the world
ω ∈ Ω such that Pi(Kj) > fi(ω) > fi(λ
∗
i ). From the definition of λ
∗
i , we have
ω /∈ Ki, but then we should have Pi(Kj) ≤ g
2
i (ω) = fi(ω) in contradiction.
We conclude that 1 − λ∗j = fi(λ
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2. Because fi(λi) =
1−λi
2λi
, we
have that
1−λ∗2
2λ∗2
= 1 − λ∗1 = 2λ
∗
1(1 − λ
∗
2), or equivalently, λ
∗
1λ
∗
2 = 1/4, in
contradiction to λ∗i ≥ 3/5 for i = 1, 2.
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In the following example Bfi (D
f(Λ)) 6= ∅ and does not satisfy the condi-
tion in Theorem 4.6, but for a smaller non-empty set, the conditions hold,
and therefore define a Bayesian equilibrium.
Example 6.6 Let a = 5, and Ω = {1/4, 1/2, 3/4}2 with a common-prior of
uniform distribution. Here λ0i = 1/2 and therefore Λi = {λi(·) ≥ 1/2}. As
in the Example 6.5, Bfi (D
f(Λ)) = Dfi (Λi,Λj) = Λi but the second condition
of Proposition 3.3 does not hold because of g1i : P1(Λ2 | (1/4, λ2)) = 2/3 >
1/2 = g1i .
For Ci = {λi = 3/4}, we get D
f
i (Ci, Cj) = Ci and the second condition of
Proposition 3.3 does hold (this can easily be verified by calculation). Therefore
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi = 3/4,
σi λi = 1/4, 1/2,
defines a Bayesian equilibrium.
7 ǫ-Equilibria
In this section, we generalize the results from the previous chapters, for the
case of ǫ-equilibria.
First, we prove the following conditions for Bayesian ǫ-equilibrium with
cooperation, similar to Theorem 3.3:
Theorem 7.1 Let ǫ > 0. In the game G, the strategy profile η∗(K1, K2) =
(η∗1(K1), η
∗
2(K2)), such that K1 ⊆ Λ1 and K2 ⊆ Λ2, is an ǫ-equilibrium for
every ω ∈ Ω if and only if, for i = 1, 2,
1. Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ f
ǫ
i (ω) for every ω ∈ Ki,
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2. Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
ǫ
i (ω) for every ω /∈ Ki.
f ǫi and g
ǫ
i are i-measurable functions that will be described in the proof, and
they tend to fi and gi when ǫ tends to 0.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, with the same
options for deviation in each case, and the payoffs are the same, only here we
assume γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(·, η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) − ǫ instead of γi(η
∗(K1, K2) |
ω) ≥ γi(·, η
∗
j (Kj) | ω).
Case 1: ω ∈ Ki.
• Deviation to σ′∗∗i — in this case γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(σ
′∗∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) |
ω)− ǫ trivially holds since γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(σ
′∗∗
i , η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) for
every ω ∈ Λi.
• Deviation to σ′∗i — here instead of inequality (1) we get
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
−
(
ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
))
+
+(1− Pi(Kj | ω))(ui(τi, σj)− ui(σ
′
i, σj)) ≥ −ǫ.(5)
or equivalently Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ f
ǫ
i (ω) where f
ǫ
i (ω) is defined by:
f ǫi (ω) := maxσ′i∈Fi
ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)−ǫ(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
,
where Fi = {σ
′
i | ui(τi, σj) < ui(σ
′
i, σj)}.
Case 2: ω /∈ Ki.
• Deviation to σ′∗i — here instead of inequality (2) we get
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
(ui(σi, τj)− ui(σ
′
i, τj))− (ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj))
)
+
+(ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj) ≥ −ǫ,
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or equivalently Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
1ǫ
i , where
g1ǫi := min
σ′i∈H
1
i
ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σj) + ǫ
(ui(σ)− ui(σ′i, σj)) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− ui(σi, τj))
,
and H1i := {σ
′
i 6= σi, τi | ui(σi, τj) < ui(σ
′
i, τj)}.
• Deviation to τi — here instead of inequality (3) we get
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
−
(
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
)
−
−(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj))) + +(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) ≥ −ǫ,
or equivalently Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
2ǫ
i (ω) where
g2ǫi (ω) :=
ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj) + ǫ
(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) +
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
whenever ui(σi, τj) + ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
<
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
and g2ǫi (ω) := 1 oth-
erwise.
• Deviation to σ′ki — here instead of inequality (4) we get
Pi(Kj | ω) (ui(τi, σj)− ui(σ) + ui(σi, τj)− ui(τ)+
+(ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, τj))(λi(ω))) + (ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)) ≥ −ǫ,
or equivalently Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ g
3ǫ
i (ω) where
g3ǫi (ω) := minσ′i∈H3i (ω)
ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj)+ǫ
(ui(σ)−ui(τi,σj))+(ui(τ)−ui(σi,τj)+(ui(σ′i,τj)−(ui(σ)))(λi(ω))
and
H3i (ω) := {σ
′
i 6= τi | ui(τ)− ui(σi, τj) + (ui(σ
′
i, τj)− (ui(σ)))λi(ω) < 0} .
Set gǫi (ω) := min{g
1ǫ
i , g
2ǫ
i (ω), g
3ǫ
i (ω)}. The proof that f
ǫ
i and g
ǫ
i are i-measurable
is the same as in the proof of Theorem 3.3. 
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Remark 7.2 Note that the conditions given in this theorem are under the
assumption that K1 ⊆ Λ1 and K2 ⊆ Λ2, and therefore the theorem does not
describe necessary conditions for η∗(K1, K2) to be an ǫ-equilibrium. For ex-
ample, define λǫi := min
{
λi |
ui(τ)
1−λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1−λi
) ≥ −ǫ ∀σ′i 6= τi
}
and Λǫ := {ω ∈ Ω | λi(ω) ≥ λ
ǫ
i i = 1, 2}. Then, when the information
regarding the discount factors is complete, η∗(Λǫ,Λǫ) is an ǫ-equilibrium, but
generally Λǫ 6⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2.
Corollary 7.3 Theorem 4.6 holds for ǫ-equilibrium with the following ad-
justments: First, instead of f and g there should be f ǫ and gǫ; and second,
in the second part of the theorem, the assumption that Ki ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2
should be added.
Proof: The proof is exactly like the proof of Theorem 4.6. 
The following lemma shows that to f ǫ-believe in an event or to 1 − gǫ-
believe in an event are weaker demands than to p-believe in an event, for
p < 1 sufficiently large. This property will be used in Section 8.
Lemma 7.4 Let Ki ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2. For ǫ > 0 small enough, there exist
constants Mi, Ni > 0 such that 0 < f
ǫ
i (ω) < 1 − ǫ/Mi for every ω ∈ Ki and
gǫi (ω) > ǫ/Ni for every ω /∈ Ki.
Proof: Let σ′′i be player i’s best response to τj in Γ, and σ
′′′
i the worst
response. It follows, from the definition of f ǫi , that
f ǫi (ω) < fi(ω)−
ǫ(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σ′′′i , τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+ (ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj))
.
Denote Mi := 2(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)). There exist λ
1
i > λ
0
i such that, for every
λi ∈ [λ
0
i , λ
1
i ],
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ
′′′
i , τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
) < Mi/2. Therefore, for every
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ω ∈ Ki such that λi(ω) ∈ [λ
0
i , λ
1
i ], f
ǫ
i (ω) < 1 − ǫ/Mi. If λi(ω) > λ
1
i , we get
that
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
−
(
ui(σ
′′
i , τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
=
= ui(τ)
(
1
1− λi(ω)
−
1
1− λ0i
)
− ui(σ)
(
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
−
λ0i
1− λ0i
)
>
> (ui(τ)− ui(σ))
(
1
1− λ1i
−
1
1− λ0i
)
=:M,
and therefore f ǫi (ω) <
M1/2
M+M1/2
. For ǫ small enough we will get f ǫi (ω) <
1−ǫ/Mi for every ω ∈ Ki. f
ǫ
i (ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ki if ǫ < ui(σ)−ui(τi, σj).
From the definitions of g1ǫi , g
2ǫ
i and g
3ǫ
i we get that, for every ω /∈ Ki,
g1ǫi > min
σ′i∈H
1
i
ǫ
ui(σ
′
i, τj)− ui(σi, τj)
,
and
g2ǫi (ω), g
3ǫ
i (ω) >
ǫ
ui(σ)− ui(τi, σj)
.
Therefore gǫi (ω) > ǫ/Ni for every ω /∈ Ki. 
Next, we generalize the results of Section 5 to ǫ-equilibria in games where
both players have only two actions.
The following lemma is the ǫ-equilibrium equivalent of Lemma 5.1:
Lemma 7.5 Assume player i has only two actions σi and τi. Then, for every
ǫ > 0, g1,ǫi = 1, for ω /∈ Λi, g
2,ǫ
i (ω), g
3
i (ω) ≥ 1, and for ω ∈ Λi, g
2,ǫ
i (ω) > f
ǫ
i (ω)
and g2,ǫi (ω) ≥ g
3,ǫ
i (ω).
Proof: All the results, except g2,ǫi (ω) ≥ g
3,ǫ
i (ω) for ω ∈ Λi, follow from
Lemma 5.1, since gk,ǫi ≥ g
k
i for k = 1, 2, 3 and fi ≥ f
ǫ
i . The same reasoning
that shows g2i (ω) ≥ g
3
i (ω) for ω ∈ Λi, g
2,ǫ
i (ω) ≥ g
3,ǫ
i (ω). 
The following corollary is the ǫ-equilibrium equivalent of Corollary 5.2:
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Corollary 7.6 1. Let Ci ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2. If both players have only two
actions, then to verify that η∗(Bf
ǫ
1 (D
fǫ(C1∩C2)), B
fǫ
2 (D
fǫ(C1∩C2)) is
a Bayesian ǫ-equilibrium, it is sufficient to verify that Pi(B
fǫ
j (D
fǫ(C1∩
C2)) | ω) ≤ f
ǫ
i (ω) for every ω ∈ Λi \B
fǫ
i (D
fǫ(C1 ∩ C2)) for i = 1, 2.
2. η∗(Bf
ǫ
1 (D
fǫ(Λ)), Bf
ǫ
2 (D
fǫ(Λ))) is an ǫ-equilibrium.
Proof:
1. This follows from Theorem 7.1, Lemma 4.5(1) and Lemma 7.5.
2. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 5.2(2), only now it follows
from Corollary 7.6(1) instead from Corollary 5.2(1). 
8 “Almost” Complete Information
In this section we look at belief spaces that are “almost” complete, in sev-
eral senses, and see whether the cooperation events when the information is
almost complete are close to the cooperation events when the information is
complete.
8.1 Knowing Approximately the Discount Factors
The first sense of “almost” complete information we consider, is when each
player knows the other’s discount factor, up to a range of ǫ > 0. That is,
player i knows his own discount factor, and is given a signal x so he knows
that player j’s discount factor is between x − ǫ and x + ǫ. As the following
example shows, in this case the cooperation events are significantly different
from the complete information cooperation events, even in the repeated Pris-
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oner’s Dilemma, regardless of ǫ, and even if we consider only δ-equilibrium
for some δ > 0.
Example 8.1 Let G be the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Let Ω = (0, 1)2, Σ
is the Borel σ-algebra, and as in previous examples, λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω)) =
ω for every ω ∈ Ω. Each player knows his own discount factor, and believes
that the other’s discount factor is within ǫ > 0 of his own; if λi(ω) = x,
then player i believes that λj is uniformly distributed in (x − ǫ, x + ǫ) (with
cutoffs if one side exceeds 0 or 1). Again, Λ1 = [1/3, 1) × (0, 1) and Λ2 =
(0, 1)× [1/3, 1). We will show that Bf1 (D
f(Λ)) = [1/2, 1)× (0, 1) regardless
of ǫ (for ǫ small enough):
Let δ > 0. Because fi is a continuous monotonically-decreasing function,
and because fi(1/2) = (1/2), there exists δ
′ > 0 such that fi(1/2−δ
′) = 1/2+
δ. Therefore, any state of the world ω such that λi(ω) < min{1/3+2ǫδ, 1/2−
δ′} is not in D1,fi (Λi,Λj). That is because for such states of the world ω, one
has Pi(Λj | ω) = Pi(λj ≥ 1/3 | ω) < 1/2+δ = fi(1/2−δ
′) < fi(ω). Therefore,
for some x1 ≥ min{1/3 + 2ǫδ, 1/2 − δ′}, D1,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) = [x
1, 1) × (0, 1), and
similarly for player 2. Therefore, any state of the world ω such that λi(ω) <
min{x1 + 2ǫδ, 1/2 − δ′} is not in D2,fi (Λi,Λj) by the same reasoning, and
D2,f1 (Λ1,Λ2) = [x
2, 1)× (0, 1) for x2 ≥ min{x1 + 2ǫδ, 1/2− δ′}. We continue
until we get that any state of the world ω such that λi(ω) < 1/2− δ
′ is not in
Dfi (Λi,Λj). This is true for every δ > 0. Because δ
′ tends to 0 as δ tends to
0, Df1 (Λ1,Λ2) ⊆ [1/2, 1)× (0, 1) (similarly for player 2). The equality follows
from Lemma 4.5(1), because [1/2, 1) × (0, 1) and (0, 1) × [1/2, 1) fulfill the
inequality.
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We get from Corollary 5.4 that
η∗i (ω) =

 τ
∗
i λi ≥ 1/2,
σi λi < 1/2,
defines a Bayesian equilibrium and that there is not such an equilibrium with
larger sets of cooperation, regardless of ǫ. Therefore, under this profile the
players cooperate when both discount factors are no less than 1/2, regardless
of ǫ, whereas is the complete information case they can cooperate whenever
both discount factors are no less than 1/3 (see Example 3.2).
Note that this analysis does not change if Ω = (0, 1)2∩{(x, y) : |x−y| < ǫ},
which verifies that the true state of the world is within the support of the
beliefs of the players. Also, if for every state of the world ω player i believes
that λj is distributed in any non-atomic symmetric way around λi(ω), the
result still holds.
For a Bayesian δ-equilibrium we follow the same route, with f δ instead
of f (see Corollary 7.6(2)). Instead of a threshold of 1/2, we show that
Bf
δ
1 (D
fδ(Λ)) =
[
1−δ
2
, 1
)
× (0, 1). That is because f δi (
1−δ
2
) = 1 − 1−δ
2
. We
get a lower threshold, which is still independent of ǫ, and, for low enough δ,
higher than 1/3.
8.2 The True Discount Factors are Common-(1 − ǫ)-
Belief in Most States of the World
In this section we assume a common prior P over the states of the world.
Definition 8.2 Let ǫ, δ > 0. We say that the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ and δ, if the set of states of the world
in which the true discount factors are common-(1 − ǫ)-belief has probability
at least 1− δ.
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From Theorem B in Mondrer and Samet (1989), we have that if the
number of states of the world is finite, then in this case there are a strategy
profile η and an event Ω′ with probability at least (1− 2ǫ)(1− δ), such that:
(a) η(ω) = η∗(Λ,Λ)(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω′; and (b) η is an ǫ′-equilibrium for ǫ′ >
4Mǫ (M is the maximum of the absolute value of the payoffs in the repeated
game, taken over all the discount factors). In other words, there is an ǫ′-
equilibrium profile that coincides over a large set with the conditional-grim-
trigger equilibrium of maximum cooperation in the complete information
case.
However, as Example 8.3 shows, this profile η may not be a conditional-
grim-trigger profile. It shows that there may be no conditional-grim-trigger
ǫ′-equilibria whatsoever, unless there are only two actions for each player (see
Corollary 8.5).
Example 8.3 Let G be the game as in Example 6.6. Let the information
structure be as follows: each player has two possible discount factors. That
is,
S = {(H1, H2), (H1, L2), (L1, H2), (L1, L2)},
where Hi is the higher discount factor of player i, and Li the lower one.
Assume Li < 1/3 < λ
0
i < Hi for i = 1, 2. In every state of nature, each
player gets a signal regarding the other player’s discount factor, which may
be either hi or li, that is Ω = S×{h1, l1}× {h2, l2}, the first two coordinates
are the discount factors, and the last two are the signals. Each player knows
only his discount factor and his signal.
The common prior on Ω is as follows: the state of nature is chosen according
to the distribution[
(1− δ)(H1, H2),
δ
3
(L1, L2),
δ
3
(L1, H2),
δ
3
(H1, L2)
]
.
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In every state of nature, there is a probability 1− ǫ that both the signals are
correct, and the other three states of the world that correspond to this state
of nature have equal probability ǫ/3. For example, if (H1, H2) is chosen, the
distribution over the states of the world is
[
(1− ǫ)(H1, H2, h1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, h1, l2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, l2)
]
.
Assume that δ ≪ ǫ.
We now calculate the beliefs of player 1, up to normalization, that is, the sum
of the coefficients in the following equations may not be 1. From symmetry,
the beliefs of player 2 are similar.
P1((H1, ·, h1, ·)) =[
((1− ǫ)(1− δ))(H1, H2, h1, h2),
(1−δ)ǫ
3
(H1, H2, h1, l2) ,
δǫ
9
(H1, L2, h1, h2),
δǫ
9
(H1, L2, h1, l2)
]
,
P1((L1, ·, l1, ·)) =[
(1−ǫ)δ
3
(L1, L2, l1, l2),
δǫ
9
(L1, L2, l1, h2) ,
δǫ
9
(L1, H2, l1, l2),
δǫ
9
(L1, H2, l1, h2)
]
,
P1((H1, ·, l1, ·)) =[
(1−δ)ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, h2),
(1−δ)ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, l2),
δǫ
9
(H1, L2, l1, l2),
(1−ǫ)δ
3
(H1, L2, l1, h2)
]
,
and
P1((L1, ·, h1, ·)) =[
δǫ
9
(L1, L2, h1, l2),
δǫ
9
(L1, L2, h1, h2),
δǫ
9
(L1, H2, h1, h2),
(1−ǫ)δ
3
(L1, H2, h1, l2)
]
.
Note that for ω = (H1, H2, h1, h2), which happens with probability (1− ǫ)(1−
δ), the true state of nature is a common-(1 − ǫ)-belief, and therefore the
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discount factors are almost complete information with respect to ǫ and ǫ+ δ,
according to Definition 8.2.
We now prove that there is no conditional-grim-trigger ǫ′-equilibrium for
small enough ǫ′, independent of ǫ and δ. Let ǫ′ be such that gǫ
′
i (Li) < 1 and
f ǫ
′
i (Hi) > 0 for i = 1, 2. These inequalities are satisfied by ǫ
′ low enough,
since (a) limǫ′→0 f
ǫ′
i = fi, limǫ′→0 g
ǫ′
i = gi, and (b) fi(Hi) > 0 and gi(Li) < 1
because Li < λ
0
i < Hi. Note that since Li < λ
0
i < Hi for i = 1, 2, we have
Λ1 = {(H1, ·, ·, ·)} and Λ2 = {(·, H2, ·, ·)}. Assume also that for i = 1, 2, ǫ
′ <
1−2Li/(1−Li) (we assumed 1/3 > Li so 1 > 2Li/(1−Li)). In this case In-
equality (5) does not hold for σ′ = D, for any Pi(Kj | ω). Suppose η
∗(K1, K2)
is an ǫ′-equilibrium profile with non-trivial cooperation events. Since In this
case Inequality (5) does not hold for player i when his discount factor is Li, we
have Ki ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2, and so the conditions of Theorem 7.1 holds. Sup-
pose that {(·, H2, ·, l2)} ⊆ K2. Then P1(K2 | (L1, H2, h1, l2)) = 1−ǫ > g
ǫ′
1 (L1)
for ǫ low enough, which is a contradiction since (L1, H2, h1, l2) /∈ K1. There-
fore K2 = {(·, H2, ·, h2)}, an by a similar argument K1 = {(H1, ·, h1, ·)}.
But then we have P1(K2|(H1, H2, h1, l2)) < ǫ < f
ǫ′
1 (H1) for low enough ǫ,
in contradiction to η∗(K1, K2) being an ǫ
′-equilibrium. Therefore there is
no conditional-grim-trigger ǫ′-equilibrium profile with non-trivial cooperation
events.
The following lemma is a result of this concept of almost complete infor-
mation:
Lemma 8.4 Set ǫ > 0 and δ > 0, and assume that the discount factors are
almost complete information with respect to ǫ and δ. Then P (Λ\D1−ǫ(Λ)) <
δ.
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Proof: Denote K = {ω ∈ Ω | λ(ω) is not a common-(1− ǫ)-belief in ω}.
From our assumption P (K) < δ. Since Λ \ D1−ǫ(Λ) ⊆ K, we have P (Λ \
D1−ǫ(Λ)) < δ. 
In the case where each player has two actions, Lemma 8.4 implies that
there is an ǫ′-equilibrium with cooperation events close to Λ:
Corollary 8.5 Suppose each player has two actions. Let ǫ > 0 and δ > 0
and M := 2maxi=1,2(ui(σ)−ui(τi, σj)). Assume that the discount factors are
almost complete information with respect to ǫ and δ. Then, for every ǫ′ ≥ Mǫ,
the strategy profile η∗(Bf
ǫ′
1 (D
fǫ
′
(Λ)), Bf
ǫ′
2 (D
fǫ
′
(Λ))) is an ǫ′-equilibrium, and
P (Λ \Df
ǫ′
(Λ)) < δ.
Proof: From Corollary 7.5(2) we have that η∗(Bf
ǫ′
1 (D
fǫ
′
(Λ)), Bf
ǫ′
2 (D
fǫ
′
(Λ)))
is an ǫ′-equilibrium. From Lemma 7.4 we have that f ǫ
′
i (ω) < 1 − ǫ for every
ω ∈ Bf
ǫ′
i (D
fǫ
′
(Λ)). Therefore D1−ǫ(Λ) ⊆ Df
ǫ′
(Λ) ⊆ Λ, so from Lemma 8.4
we have that P (Λ \Df
ǫ′
(Λ)) < δ. 
8.3 Each Player (1− ǫ)-Believes that a State of Nature
is Common-(1− ǫ)-Belief
In this section we assume that the information is almost complete in a dif-
ferent sense:
Definition 8.6 Let ǫ > 0. We say that the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ, if for every state of the world ω, each
player (1− ǫ)-believes in ω that some state of nature is common-(1− ǫ)-belief
in ω.
We show that when the discount factors are almost complete information
with respect to ǫ, according to Definition 8.6, there is a simple conditional-
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grim-trigger profile, which is an ǫ′-equilibrium for ǫ′ ≥ Mǫ (M > 0 is a con-
stant which depends only on the game and not on the information structure).
While this assumption can hold without the information structure derived
from a common prior on the state of the world, we show that if it does,
this concept of almost complete information is stronger than the concept in
Definition 8.2. Also, under this assumption (with the common prior), in the
simple conditional-grim-trigger ǫ′-equilibrium mentioned above the players
cooperate in all the states of the world in which there is a cooperation un-
der the conditional-grim-trigger equilibrium of maximum cooperation in the
complete information case, η∗(Λ,Λ), but for a set with small probability. In
other words, under a stronger concept of almost complete information, we
have a result which is quite similar to the one in Theorem B of Mondrer and
Samet (1989), but with a conditional-grim-trigger profile which is defined
explicitly for every state of the world.
Proposition 8.7 Let ǫ > 0. Assume that the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ, according to Definition 8.6. Then, the
strategy profile η∗(B1−ǫ1 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)), B1−ǫ2 (D
1−ǫ(Λ))) is an ǫ′-equilibrium, for
every ǫ′ > Mǫ, where M > 0 is a constant, independent of the information
structure and of ǫ.
Proof: Denote Ki := B
1−ǫ
i (D
1−ǫ(Λ)). Note that Ki ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2. From
Lemma 7.4, there is an M > 0 such that for every ǫ′ ≥ Mǫ and i = 1, 2, we
have f ǫ
′
i (ω) < 1− ǫ for every ω ∈ Ki and g
ǫ′
i (ω) > ǫ for every ω /∈ Ki.
For every ω ∈ Ki, we have Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ Pi(D
1−ǫ(Λ) | ω) ≥ 1−ǫ > f ǫ
′
i (ω).
For every ω /∈ Ki, we have from our assumption that player i (1− ǫ)-believes
in ω that some state of nature is a common-(1− ǫ)-belief in ω, but this state
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of nature is not in Λ. Therefore, ω ∈ B1−ǫi (D
1−ǫ(Λc)). Therefore we have
Pi(Kj | ω) = 1− Pi(K
c
j | ω) = 1− Pi(B
1−ǫ
j (D
1−ǫ(Λc)) | ω) ≤
≤ 1− Pi(D
1−ǫ(Λc) | ω) < ǫ < gǫ
′
i (ω).
From Theorem 7.1 we have that η∗(K1, K2) is an ǫ
′-equilibrium. 
Remark 8.8 1. Under this strategy profile, both players will cooperate if
and only if ω ∈ D1−ǫ(Λ), since B1−ǫi (D
1−ǫ(Λ)) ⊆ Λi.
2. D1−ǫ(Λ) may be empty, and then η∗(B1−ǫ1 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)), B1−ǫ2 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)) a
trivial profile with no cooperation.
Proposition 8.9 Let ǫ > 0. Assume that (a) the information structure is
derived from a common prior P ; (b) the discount factors are almost complete
information with respect to ǫ, according to Definition 8.6; and (c) the number
of state of nature is finite or countable. Then the discount factors are almost
complete information with respect to ǫ and 3ǫ according to Definition 8.2.
Proof: Denote by K the set of states of the world ω such that there is a
state of nature which is a common-(1− ǫ)-belief in ω. From assumption (b)
we have that for every state of the world ω, Pi(K | ω) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Therefore
P (K) ≥ 1−ǫ. For every state of nature λ, denote Gλ := {ω ∈ Ω | λ(ω) = λ},
and Ω′ =
⋃
λ(G
λ∩D1−ǫ(Gλ)). Our goal is to show that P (Ω′) > 1−3ǫ. This
is shown in the proof of Theorem B of Mondrer and Samet (1989). 
From Propositions 8.7 and 8.4, Remark 8.8 and Lemma 8.4 we conclude
the following, which is the generalization of Corollary 8.5 for games with
more than two actions for each player:
Corollary 8.10 Let ǫ > 0. Assume that (a) the information structure is
derived from a common prior P ; (b) the discount factors are almost com-
plete information with respect to ǫ, according to Definition 8.6; and (c) the
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number of state of nature is finite or countable. Then (A) the strategy profile
η∗(B1−ǫ1 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)), B1−ǫ2 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)) is an ǫ′-equilibrium, for every ǫ′ > Mǫ,
where M > 0 is a constant, independent of the information structure and of
ǫ; (B) under this strategy profile, both players will cooperate if and only if
ω ∈ D1−ǫ(Λ); and (C) P (Λ \D1−ǫ(Λ)) < 3ǫ.
Example 8.11 Let G, S and Ω be as in Example 8.3. The common prior is
as follows: the state of nature is chosen uniformly. In every state of nature,
there is a probability 1 − ǫ that both the signals are correct, and the other
three states of the world that correspond to this state of nature have equal
probability ǫ/3. For example, if (H1, H2) was chosen, the distribution over
the states of the world is
[
(1− ǫ)(H1, H2, h1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, h1, l2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, l2)
]
.
We now calculate the beliefs of player 1. From symmetry, the beliefs of player
2 are similar.
P1((H1, ·, h1, ·)) =[
(1− ǫ)(H1, H2, h1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, h1, l2) ,
ǫ
3
(H1, L2, h1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, L2, h1, l2)
]
,
P1((L1, ·, l1, ·)) =[
(1− ǫ)(L1, L2, l1, l2),
ǫ
3
(L1, L2, l1, h2) ,
ǫ
3
(L1, H2, l1, l2),
ǫ
3
(L1, H2, l1, h2)
]
,
P1((H1, ·, l1, ·)) =[
(1− ǫ)(H1, L2, l1, h2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, l2),
ǫ
3
(H1, L2, l1, l2),
ǫ
3
(H1, H2, l1, h2)
]
,
and
P1((L1, ·, h1, ·)) =[
(1− ǫ)(L1, H2, h1, l2),
ǫ
3
(L1, L2, h1, h2),
ǫ
3
(L1, H2, h1, h2),
ǫ
3
(L1, L2, h1, l2)
]
.
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Note that indeed, for every state of the world ω, each player (1− ǫ)-believes
in ω that some state of nature is a common-(1 − ǫ)-belief in ω, so the dis-
count factors are almost complete information with respect to ǫ, according to
definition 8.6.
As in Example 8.3, Λ1 = {(H1, ·, ·, ·)} and Λ2 = {(·, H2, ·, ·)}, and so Λ =
{(H1, H2, ·, ·)}. ThereforeD
1−ǫ = {(H1, H2, h1, h2)}, and so B
1−ǫ
1 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)) =
{(H1, ·, h1, ·)} and B
1−ǫ
2 (D
1−ǫ(Λ)) = {(·, H2, ·, h2)}. Therefore, from Corol-
lary 8.10 we conclude that η∗({(H1, ·, h1, ·)}, {(·, H2, ·, h2)}) is an ǫ
′-equilibrium
for every ǫ′ ≥ Mǫ. Under this strategy profile each player cooperates if both
his discount factor and his signal are high, and both players cooperate if the
state of the world is (H1, H2, h1, h2). Indeed, as in Corollary 8.10, we have
that P (Λ \ {(H1, H2, h1, h2)}) = ǫ < 3ǫ.
Note that if H1 and H2 are high enough, we have Pi(Λ | ω) ≥ fi(ω) >
f ǫ
′
i (ω) for every ω ∈ Λi, and therefore B
f
i (D
f(Λ)) = Bf
ǫ′
i (D
fǫ
′
(Λ)) = Λi
for i = 1, 2, and Df(Λ) = Df
ǫ′
(Λ) = Λ. This implies that η∗(Λ1,Λ2) may
be an equilibrium or an ǫ′-equilibrium with larger cooperation events. But,
if ǫ is small enough, we have P1(Λ2 | (L1, H2, h2, l1)) > 1 − ǫ > g
1,ǫ′
1 ≥
g2,ǫ
′
1 ((L1, H2, h2, l1)), so the second condition of Theorem 7.1 does not hold
and η∗(Λ1,Λ2) in not an ǫ
′-equilibrium.
9 Generalizations
In this section we generalize the results of the previous sections in several
ways. First, we see that the main result (Theorem 3.3) holds, with some
adjustments, even when each player does not know his own discount factor.
Second, we generalize Theorem 3.3 for general games with incomplete infor-
mation, with respect to a course of action that is an equilibrium in every state
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of the world (equivalent to σ∗), and a course of action that is an equilibrium
only in some states of the world (equivalent to τ ∗). Last, we analyze the case
of repeated games with incomplete information on the discount factor with
more than two players.
9.1 The Results when One’s Own Discount Factor is
Unknown
In this section we assume that each player does not know his own discount
factor in every state of the world. In this case, most of the arguments in the
proof of Theorem 3.3 still hold, with the following adjustments. In order to
avoid measurability problems, we assume in this section that Ω is finite or
countable, Σ is the power set of Ω, and Σi is generated by the “types” of
player i.
When calculating the expected payoffs, we cannot take λi out of the
expectation, since λi(ω) is no longer known to player i given ω. For example,
instead of:
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)
(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
)
+ (1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
when ω ∈ Ki, the expected payoff is:
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)Ei
(
ui(τ)
1−λi
| ω
)
+
+(1− Pi(Kj | ω))
(
ui(τi, σj) + ui(σ)Ei
(
λi
1−λi
| ω
))
.
Similarly, Λi is no longer the set {ω ∈ Ω | λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i }, which is no longer
necessarily an i-measurable set.
Rather Λi :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | ∀σ′i Ei(
ui(τ)
1−λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1−λi
) | ω) ≥ 0
}
. That
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is the set of states of the world in which player i believes he cannot profit by
deviating from the profile τ ∗.
The main adjustment in Theorem 3.3 itself is that it is not necessary that
Ki ⊆ Λi. Indeed, this requirement was derived from the inequality:
∀σ′i 6= τi Pi(Kj | ω)λi(ω)
(
ui(τ)
1− λi(ω)
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1− λi(ω)
)
)
≥ 0,
and because λi > 0, it follows that either Pi(Kj | ω) = 0 or ω ∈ Λi.
When one’s own discount factor is unknown, this inequality becomes
Pi(Kj | ω)Ei
(
λi
(
ui(τ)
1− λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1− λi
)
)
| ω
)
≥ 0, ∀σ′i 6= τi,
but here Ei
(
λi
(
ui(τ)
1−λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τj) + ui(σ)
λi
1−λi
)
)
| ω
)
≥ 0 is weaker than ω ∈
Λi. Therefore, there may be games such that there are events Ki 6⊆ Λi
such that η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium, but then the conditions are
different from these of Theorem 3.3 — if ω ∈ Ki \ Λi, player i may have to
h-believe in Kcj in the state of the world ω, for a certain function h, since
he has a profitable deviation from τ ∗ in ω. This may be in in addition to
f -believing in Kj in the state of the world ω. See Example 9.3.
Under the assumption that K1 ⊆ Λ1 for i = 1, 2, the rest of the proof
does not change, and so we get the following result.
Theorem 9.1 In the game G, the strategy profile η∗(K1, K2), such that
K1 ⊆ Λ1 and K2 ⊆ Λ2, is a Bayesian equilibrium, if and only if, for i = 1, 2,
1. Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki,
2. Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ gi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki.
The functions fi and gi are the same as before, with the natural adjust-
ments; for example, instead of:
fi(ω) := maxσ′i∈Fi
ui(σ
′
i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
,
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now we have:
fi(ω) := maxσ′i∈Fi
ui(σ
′
i,σj)−ui(τi,σj)
Ei
(
ui(τ)
1−λi
−(ui(σ′i,τj)+ui(σ)
λi
1−λi
)|ω
)
+(ui(σ′i,σj)−ui(τi,σj))
.
Note also that the sets over which the maxima and minima are taken when
calculating f and g may change according to the same adjustments.
Remark 9.2 • Note that because now we assume that Ki ⊆ Λi for i =
1, 2, we can omit the assumption that τi is not a best response to σj,
retaining only the weaker assumption that τi is not in the support of σi.
• Because of that, as mentioned in Remark 3.5(2), we may get that fi =
0. This may also be the case even if τi is not a best response to σj (which
was not the case in the original theorem, see Remark 3.6(2)). That
happens if and only if the distribution λi(ω) such that Ei
(
1
1−λi
| ω
)
=
∞.
• In this case, the functions fi and gi have a slightly different form if we
take the payoffs as γi = Ei((1− λi)
∑∞
t=1 λ
t−1
i u
t
i | ω) (with the (1 − λi)
in the expectation). The only significant difference is that in this case
the payoffs are bounded and therefore Remark 3.6(2) still holds.
The following example shows that the assumption Ki ⊆ Λi for i = 1, 2 in
Theorem 9.1 cannot be omitted — η∗(K1, K2) may be a Bayesian equilibrium
without this assumption, but then the conditions are quite different.
Example 9.3 Consider the following game:
C
D
D C
N
N
−10, ·
0, 4
1, 1
10, ·
3, 3
4, 0
·, ·
·, 10
·,−10
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(payoffs not indicated can be arbitrary). Here σ = (D,D), τ = (C,C).
Both players have the same discount factor, that can be either 4/5 or 2/5,
so that S = {2/5, 4/5}. Let the information structure be the following: Ω =
S × S1 × S2, where Si = {Hi, Li, Xi} are the possible signals of player i.
Denote the signal that player i receives by si. The first coordinate is the
common discount factor in each state of the world, that is λ((a, s1, s2)) = a.
Each player knows only his own signal, and his beliefs are as follows: If player
i gets the signal Hi he believes that the state of the world is (4/5, H1, H2):
the discount factor is 4/5 and this fact is common belief. If player i gets the
signal Li he believes that the state of the world is (2/5, L1, L2): the discount
factor is 2/5 and this fact is common belief. If player i gets the signal Xi,
he believes that the state of the world is (2/5, Xi, Lj) with probability p, and
(4/5, Xi, Hj) with probability 1− p, where 3/20 < p < 6/23.
The best deviation from τ ∗ is to play N in the first stage and from
the second stage on to play D. This deviation is profitable for player i if
and only if Ei
(
ui(C,C)
1
1−λ
−
(
ui(Ni, Cj) + ui(D,D)
λ
1−λ
)
| ω
)
≥ 0, that is if
Ei
(
2λ
1−λ
| ω
)
≥ 7. Since p > 3/20, it follows that Λi = {si = Hi}.
Denote Ki = {si = Hi or si = Xi}. We prove that η
∗(K1, K2) is a
Bayesian equilibrium, even though Ki 6⊆ Λi. Because the game, the infor-
mation structure and η∗(K1, K2) are symmetric, it is sufficient to show that
there is no profitable deviation for player 1. If player 1’s signal is s1 = H1,
he believes that it is a common belief that λ = 4/5, and that player 2 plays
τ ∗2 . Since in this case ω ∈ Λi, there is no profitable deviation from τ
∗ for
player 1. If player 1’s signal is s1 = L1, he believes that player 2 always plays
D, and therefore player 1 cannot profit from deviating from η∗1(K1) (which
in this case is “always play D”). If player 1’s signal is s1 = X1, he plays
τ ∗1 . Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, to prove that there is no profitable
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deviation, two inequalities have to be satisfied:
P1(K2 | ω)E1
(
λ
(
3
1− λ
− (u1(σ
′
1, C) +
λ
1− λ
)
)
| ω
)
≥ 0,
and
P1(K2 | ω)E1
(
3
1−λ
−
(
u1(σ
′
1, C) +
λ
1−λ
)
| ω
)
+
+(1− P1(K2 | ω))(0− u1(σ
′
1, D)) ≥ 0,
for σ′1 = D or σ
′
1 = N . For σ
′
1 = D, the first inequality holds since λ > 1/3
with probability 1 (it is the same inequality as in the prisoner’s dilemma,
where λ01 = 1/3). The second inequality is equivalent to P1(K2 | ω)(8 −
20
3
p) − 1 ≥ 0. For σ′1 = N , the first inequality holds since p < 6/23. The
second inequality is equivalent to −P1(K2 | ω)(9 +
20
3
p) + 10 ≥ 0. Therefore,
we have that η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium if and only if P1(K2 |
ω)(8 − 20
3
p)− 1 ≥ 0 and 10 − P1(K2 | ω)(9 +
20
3
p) ≥ 0. The first inequality
holds for high enough P1(K2 | ω), which is similar to the first condition in
Theorem 9.1, but the second inequality only holds for low enough P1(K2 | ω),
which is a significantly different condition (it is h-believing in Kc2 in addition
to f -believing in K2).
To complete the proof that η∗(K1, K2), observe that when s1 = X1, we
have P1(K2 | ω) = 1−p. Therefore 10−P1(K2 | ω)(9+
20
3
p) ≥ 0 is equivalent
to (1 − p)(1 − 20p
3
) + 10p ≥ 0. Since p < 6/23, we have 1 − 20p
3
> −17
23
, so
(1 − p)(1 − 20p
3
) + 10p > 247
17
p − 17
23
, and 247
17
p − 17
23
> 0 for every p > 3/20.
Similarly, P1(K2 | ω)(8−
20
3
p)−1 ≥ 0 is equivalent to (1−p)(8− 20
3
p)−1 ≥ 0,
which holds for every p ≤ 7/10.
Our results regarding games with only two actions for each player does
not hold in this more general case. Lemma 5.1 does not hold in this case:
g1i = 1, g
2
i (ω) = g
3
i (ω) = 1 for every ω /∈ Λi, and g
2
i (ω) = fi(ω) ≤ g
3
i (ω) for
every ω ∈ Λi still hold, but g
3
i (ω) needs not be 1 for every ω /∈ Λi. Therefore,
Corollary 5.2 does not hold in this case.
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9.2 General games
In this subsection we expand Theorem 3.3 to a broader class of two-players
Bayesian games (not only repeated games with incomplete information re-
garding the discount factors). While up till now we assumed that the sets of
actions (Ai)
2
i=1 and the payoff functions (ui)
2
i=1 are independent in the state
of the world, now it is not the case: for every ω ∈ Ω, Ai(s(ω)) is the set of
the actions of player i in the state of the world ω, and ui(s(ω)) is his payoff.
Let G = (N, (S,S),Π, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) be a general two-player Bayesian
game. To avoid measurability problems, assume that the states of the world
are finite or countable. Assume that there is a course of action profile σ∗ =
(σ∗1, σ
∗
2) such that, when the information is complete, is an equilibrium for
all states of nature, and that there is another course of action profile, τ ∗ =
(τ ∗1 , τ
∗
2 ) which is an equilibrium in only some states of nature. Suppose that
the supports of τ ∗i and σ
∗
i are disjoint in all states of the world, that is, it
is discernable whether player i plays σ∗i or τ
∗
i . A strategy of player i is an
i-measurable function that assigns each state of the world a course of action
of player i.
Let Λi ⊆ Ω be the event “player i believes that he cannot benefit by
deviating from the profile τ ∗”. That is, for every ω ∈ Λi and every course of
action σ′i of player i, Ei(ui(τ
∗) | ω) ≥ Ei(ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) | ω).
Theorem 9.4 In the game G, there exist i-measurable functions 0 ≤ fi, gi ≤
1, i = 1, 2, such that if K1 ⊆ Λ1 andK2 ⊆ Λ2, the strategy profile η
∗(K1, K2) =
(η∗1(K1), η
∗
2(K2)), is a Bayesian equilibrium, if and only if, for i = 1, 2,
1. Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki,
2. Pi(Kj | ω) ≤ gi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki.
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Remark 9.5 There are several differences between the results of this theorem
and Theorem 3.3:
• Here we assume that K1 ⊆ Λ1 and K2 ⊆ Λ2 whereas in Theorem 3.3 we
showed it was necessary for η∗(K1, K2) to be a Bayesian equilibrium.
This weakened result allows us to drop the assumption that τ ∗i is not
a best response to σ∗j , and only requires that it is discernable whether
player i plays σ∗i or τ
∗
i (disjoint supports).
7
• We do not assume that the realized payoffs are observed, so that all a
player knows is his an expected payoff based on his information on the
states of nature.
• We do not assume that the payoffs when τ ∗ is played are higher than
when σ∗ is played.
Proof of Theorem 9.4: Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, we have two
cases.
Case 1: ω ∈ Ki.
The payoff of player i when η∗(K1, K2) is played is
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)Ei(ui(τ
∗) | ω) + (1− Pi(Kj | ω))Ei(ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j ) | ω).
If player i deviates to a course of action σ′i 6= τ
∗
i , then his payoff is
γi(σ
′
i, η
∗
j (K2) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)Ei(ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) | ω) + (1− Pi(Kj | ω))Ei(ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω).
7Still, as before, if we do assume that τ∗i is not a best response to σ
∗
j , we get fi > 0 ,
assuming that the payoffs in G are bounded.
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Because η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium, γi(η
∗) ≥ γi(σ
′
i, η
∗
j ) for every
σ′i, or
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
Ei(ui(τ
∗)− ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) | ω)− Ei(ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j )− ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω)
)
+
+Ei(ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j )− ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω) ≥ 0, (6)
for every σ′i 6= τ
∗
i . By assumption Ki ⊆ Λi, so that Ei(ui(τ
∗) − ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) |
ω) ≥ 0. If Ei(ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j ) − ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω) ≥ 0, then inequality (6) trivially
holds. Otherwise, inequality (6) is equivalent to Pi(Kj | ω) ≥ fi(ω), where
fi(ω) := sup
σ′i∈Fi
Ei(ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j )− ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j ) | ω)
Ei(ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j )− ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j ) | ω) + Ei(ui(τ
∗)− ui(σ′i, τ
∗
j ) | ω)
,
and Fi = {σ
′
i | Ei(ui(τ
∗
i , σ
∗
j ) | ω) < Ei(ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω)}.
Case 2: ω /∈ Ki.
The payoff of player i under η∗(K1, K2) is
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)Ei(ui(σi, τj) | ω) + (1− Pi(Kj | ω))Ei(ui(σ) | ω).
If player i deviates to a course of action σ′i 6= σ
∗
i , then his payoff is
γi(σ
′
i, η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) =
= Pi(Kj | ω)Ei(ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) | ω) + (1− Pi(Kj | ω))Ei(ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω).
Since η∗(K1, K2) is a Bayesian equilibrium,
γi(η
∗(K1, K2) | ω) ≥ γi(σ
′
i, η
∗
j (Kj) | ω) for every σ
′
i 6= σ
∗
i , or equivalently
Pi(Kj | ω)
(
Ei(ui(σ
∗
i , τ
∗
j )− ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j ) | ω)− Ei(ui(σ
∗)− ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω)
)
+
+Ei(ui(σ
∗)− ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω) ≥ 0, (7)
for every σ′i 6= σ
∗
i . Because σ
∗ is an equilibrium in every state of nature,
Ei(ui(σ)−ui(σ
′
i, σj) ≥ 0. Therefore, if Ei(ui(σi, τj)−ui(σ
′
i, τj) ≥ 0, inequality
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(7) trivially holds. Otherwise, inequality (7) is equivalent to Pi(Kj | ω) ≤
gi(ω) where
gi(ω) := inf
σ′i∈Gi
Ei(ui(σ
∗)− ui(σ
′
i, σ
∗
j ) | ω)
Ei(ui(σ∗)− ui(σ′i, σ
∗
j ) | ω) + Ei(ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j )− ui(σ
∗
i , τ
∗
j ) | ω)
,
and Gi = {σ
′
i | Ei(ui(σ
∗
i , τ
∗
j ) | ω) < Ei(ui(σ
′
i, τ
∗
j )) | ω)}. 
9.3 More than Two Players
In this section we show that while the same analysis can be used to derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for conditional-grim-trigger equilibria in
repeated games with incomplete information on the discount factors with
more than two players, these conditions are much more complex than in two
player games. We provide simple conditions, similar to those in previous sec-
tions (i.e., f -believing in an event at a state of the world), which are sufficient
for a conditional-grim-trigger strategy profile to be a Bayesian equilibrium,
but are not necessary (Theorem 9.6).
Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a one-shot game, with N = {1, 2, ..., N}
the set of players. Let σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σN) be a mixed-strategies Nash equi-
librium in Γ. Assume that the payments in another non-equilibrium pure
action profile τ = (τ1, τ2, ..., τN ), are higher than the equilibrium payments,
that is ui(τ) > ui(σ) for every i ∈ N . Also, assume that for every i ∈ N , τi
is not in the support of σi.
Let G = (N, (S,S),Π, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) be the repeated game based on
Γ, with incomplete information regarding the discount factors, similar to the
one described in Section 2, where each player knows his own discount factor.
Let τ ∗i and σ
∗
i be defined as in the two-player case.
8 Again, σ∗ is an
8When there are more than two players, τ∗i is triggered whenever there is at least one
player that deviate from τ∗.
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equilibrium course of action regardless of the discount factors. Player i does
not have a profitable deviation from τ ∗ if and only if λi > λ
0
i , where
λ0i := min
{
λi |
ui(τ)
1− λi
− (ui(σ
′
i, τ−i) + ui(σ)
λi
1− λi
) ≥ 0 ∀σ′i 6= τi
}
.
As before, denote Λi := {ω ∈ Ω | λi(ω) ≥ λ
0
i }.
The conditional-grim-trigger strategy is defined in the same way as in the
two-player case, only now there is a cooperation event for eack player in N ,
so the strategy profile is η∗(K1, K2, ..., KN) = (η
∗
1(K1), η
∗
2(K2), ..., η
∗
N(KN)).
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions that guarantee that the
profile η∗(K1, K2, ..., KN) is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Theorem 9.6 Suppose that Ki ⊆ Λi, for every i ∈ N . The strategy profile
η∗(K1, K2, ..., KN) is a Bayesian equilibrium in the game G, if, for every
i ∈ N ,
1. Pi(
⋂
j 6=iKj | ω) ≥ fi(ω) for every ω ∈ Ki,
2. Pi(
⋃
j 6=iKj | ω) ≤ gi(ω) for every ω /∈ Ki.
Where the functions fi and gi are defined by:
fi(ω) := max
σ′i 6=τi
2Mi(
ui(τ)
1−λi(ω)
− (ui(σ′i, τ−i) + ui(σ)
λi(ω)
1−λi(ω)
)
)
+ 2Mi
,
and gi(ω) := min{g
1
i , g
2
i (ω)}, where
g1i := max
σ′i 6=τi,σi
ui(σ)− ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)
ui(σ)− ui(σ′i, σ−i) + 2Mi
,
g2i (ω) :=
(1− λi(ω))(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σ−i))
(1− λi(ω))(ui(σ)− ui(τi, σ−i)) + 2Mi
,
and Mi := max{|ui(a1, ..., aN)| | aj ∈ Aj for j ∈ N}.
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These conditions mean that in order for η∗(K1, K2, ..., KN) to be a Bayesian
equilibrium, player i needs to f -believe in a the event
⋂
j 6=iKj whenever he
plays τ ∗i , and to (1 − g)-believe in the event
⋃
j 6=iKj, whenever he plays σ
∗
i .
Note that when there are more then two players, these two events may not
be the same.
Proof: The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 3.3. For
simplicity, we assume that N = 3. The analysis for games with more than
three players is similar. Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to prove
that player 1 does not have a profitable deviation.
Case 1: ω ∈ K1.
Player 1’s payoff under the strategy profile η∗(K1, K2, K3) is
γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, τ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, σ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))
(
u1(τ1, σ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we need to consider the following deviations:
• Let σ′1 6= τ1, and define the course of action σ
′∗∗
1 by: Player 1 plays τ1
in the first stage, an if the action profile τ was played in the first stage,
player 1 plays a pure action σ′1 in stage 2 and σ1 afterwards. If the
action profile τ was not played in the first stage, player 1 plays σ1 from
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the second stage onwards. If player 1 plays σ′∗∗1 , his payoff is:
γ1(σ
′∗∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ) + u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3)λ1(ω) + u1(σ)
(λ1(ω))2
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, τ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, σ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))
(
u1(τ1, σ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
.
Since η∗(K1, K2, K3) is a Bayesian equilibrium, γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) |
ω) ≥ γ1(σ
′∗∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω), or equivalently,
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)λ1(ω)
(
u1(τ)
1−λ1(ω)
− (u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
)
≥ 0,
for every σ′1 6= τ1. Because λ1 > 0, either P1(K2 ∩ K3 | ω) = 0 or
ω ∈ Λ1, which is a similar result to the two-player case.
• Let σ′1 6= τ1, and define the course of action σ
′∗
1 by: Player 1 plays σ
′
1
in the first stage and σ1 afterwards. If player 1 plays σ
′∗
1 , his payoff is:
γ1(σ
′∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3) + P1(K2 \K3 | ω)u1(σ
′
1, τ2, σ3)+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)u1(σ
′
1, σ2, τ3 + (1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3)+
+u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
.
Since η∗(K1, K2, K3) is a Bayesian equilibrium, γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) |
ω) ≥ γ1(σ
′∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω), or equivalently,
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ)
1− λ1(ω)
− (u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1− λ1(ω)
)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)(u1(τ1, τ2, σ3)− u1(σ
′
1, τ2, σ3)) +
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)(u1(τ1, σ2, τ3)− u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3)) +
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(τ1, σ2, σ3)− u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3)) ≥ 0. (8)
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This is the analogue of inequality (1) in the two-players game, only here
this condition is not equivalent to a simple f -belief type condition.
However, the left hand side of inequality (8) is no less than
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ)
1−λ1(ω)
− (u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
)
−
2M1(1− P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)),
and so it is a sufficient condition that
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ)
1−λ1(ω)
− (u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
)
−
2M1(1− P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)) ≥ 0,
for every σ′1 6= τ1, which is equivalent to K1 ⊂ Λ1 and P1(K2 ∩ K3 |
ω) ≥ fi(ω).
Case 2: ω /∈ K1.
Player 1’s payoff under the strategy profile η∗(K1, K2, K3) is
γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(σ1, τ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)
(
u1(σ1, τ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)
(
u1(σ1, σ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))
u1(σ)
1−λ1(ω)
.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we need to consider the following deviations:
• Deviation to σ′∗1 , for σ
′
1 6= τ1, σ1 (σ
′
1 may be in the support of σ1, if σ1
is not a pure action). The payoff is:
γ1(σ
′∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3) + P1(K2 \K3 | ω)u1(σ
′
1, τ2, σ3)+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)u1(σ
′
1, σ2, τ3 + (1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3)+
+u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
.
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Since η∗(K1, K2, K3) is a Bayesian equilibrium, γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) |
ω) ≥ γ1(σ
′∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω), or equivalently,
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)(u1(σ1, τ2, τ3)− u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3)) +
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)(u1(σ1, τ2, σ3)− u1(σ
′
1, τ2, σ3)) +
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)(u1(σ1, σ2, τ3)− u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3)) +
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ2)− u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3)) ≥ 0. (9)
This is the analogue of inequality (2) in the two-players game, only here
this condition is not equivalent to a simple f -belief type condition.
However, the left hand side of inequality (9) is no less than
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3))− 2M1P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω),
and so it is a sufficient condition that
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(σ
′
1, σ2, σ3))−
2M1P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω) ≥ 0,
for every σ′1 6= τ1, σ1, which is equivalent to P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω) ≤ g
1
i .
• Deviation to τ ∗1 . The payoff is:
γ1(τ
∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, τ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, σ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))
(
u1(τ1, σ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
.
Since η∗(K1, K2, K3) is a Bayesian equilibrium, γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) |
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ω) ≥ γ1(τ
∗
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω), or equivalently,
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(σ1, τ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1− λ1(ω)
−
u1(τ)
1− λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)(u1(σ1, τ2, σ3)− u1(τ1, τ2, σ3)) +
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)(u1(σ1, σ2, τ3)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3)) +
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3)) ≥ 0.(10)
This is the analogue of inequality (3) in the two-players game, only here
this condition is not equivalent to a simple f -belief type condition.
However, the left hand side of inequality (10), multiplied by 1− λ1(ω),
is no less than
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3))(1− λ1(ω))−
2M1P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω),
and so it is a sufficient condition that
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3))(1− λ1(ω))−
2M1P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω) ≤ g
2
i (ω).
• Deviation to σ′11 , defined by:
– Play τ1 in the first stage.
– If the profile τ was played in the first stage, play a pure σ′1 6= τ1,
and afterwards σ1.
– If the profile τ was not played in the first stage, play σ1 from the
second stage onwards.
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The payoff is:
γ1(σ
′1
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω) =
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ) + u1(σ
′
1, τ2, τ3)λ1(ω) + ui(σ)
(λ1(ω))2
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, τ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)
(
u1(τ1, σ2, τ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
+
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))
(
u1(τ1, σ2, σ3) + u1(σ)
λ1(ω)
1−λ1(ω)
)
.
Since η∗(K1, K2, K3) is a Bayesian equilibrium, γ1(η
∗(K1, K2, K3) |
ω) ≥ γ1(σ
′1
1 , η
∗
2(K2), η
∗
3(K3) | ω), or equivalently,
P1(K2 ∩K3 | ω) (u1(σ1, τ−1)− u1(τ) + (u1(σ)− u1(σ
′
1, τ−1))λ1(ω)) +
P1(K2 \K3 | ω)(u1(σ1, τ2, σ3)− u1(τ1, τ2, σ3)) +
P1(K3 \K2 | ω)(u1(σ1, σ2, τ3)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3)) +
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3)) ≥ 0.(11)
This is the analogue of inequality (4) in the two-players game, only here
this condition is not equivalent to a simple f -belief type condition.
However, the left hand side of inequality (11) is no less than
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3))−
2M1P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω)(1 + λ1(ω)),
and so it is a sufficient condition that
(1− P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω))(u1(σ)− u1(τ1, σ2, σ3))−
2M1P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω)(1 + λ1(ω)) ≥ 0,
which is a weaker condition than P1(K2 ∪K3 | ω) ≤ g
2
i (ω).
The proof that fi and gi are i-measurable is the same as in the proof of
Theorem 3.3. 
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